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ABSTRACT 
  Hollywood film projects involving significant capital investments 
regularly proceed on the basis of unsigned “deal memos” and draft 
agreements with uncertain legal enforceability. These “soft contracts” 
constitute a hybrid instrument adapted to the transactional hazards of 
an environment in which neither formal contract nor reputation 
effects can adequately specify and enforce parties’ commitments at 
any reasonable cost. Uncertainly enforceable contracts embed an 
implicit termination-and-renegotiation option that provides flexibility 
to respond to changed circumstances while maintaining a threat of 
legal liability that provides some transactional security. Evidence 
collected from litigation records, trade-press coverage, and field 
interviews shows that parties select “softer” or “harder” contractual 
instruments following a marginal cost–benefit calculus that secures 
parties’ commitments at the lowest transaction-cost burden. Observed 
differences in the formalization levels selected with respect to different 
stages, elements, and parties in a film production reflect underlying 
differences in reputational capital, transactional experience, 
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specification costs, enforcement costs, and holdup risk. A survey of 
litigation records and trade-press coverage since the inception of the 
Hollywood motion-picture industry suggests that soft contracts 
emerged as a substitute for the long-term employment contracts that 
secured studios’ and talent’s commitments in the era of the “studio 
system.” 
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“Aren’t you people ever going to come in front of me with a signed 
contract?”1  
INTRODUCTION 
The Hollywood motion-picture industry2 regularly enters into 
significant commitments under various species of incomplete 
agreements: oral communications, informal correspondence, deal 
memoranda, and draft agreements that are negotiated throughout a 
production and often remain unsigned. These unsigned deals—what I 
call “soft contracts”—are supported by an uncertain threat of legal 
enforcement coupled with some prospect of reputational liability. 
Hollywood’s loose transactional practices challenge conventional 
expectations that an enforceable contract is a precondition for any 
significant financial undertaking. Business lawyers usually make 
special efforts to protect clients (and themselves) by avoiding the 
predicament of being potentially, but not certainly, subject to legal 
liability. Hollywood departs from this prudent approach. 
 
 1. This statement was reportedly made by the presiding judge to Warner Bros.’ counsel in 
litigation involving an alleged breach of oral contract by Rodney Dangerfield. See Joseph D. 
Schleimer, Coppola Verdict’s Impact on Studio/Talent Talks, 16 ENT. L. & FIN., No. 6 (Sept. 
1998), available at http://www.schleimerlaw.com/ELF998.htm. 
 2. By “Hollywood,” I refer throughout to the motion-picture (and, where specified, the 
television) industry based in Southern California, including the major film studios and the 
network of smaller entities that transact with those studios.  
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Existing explanations attribute Hollywood’s contracting practices 
to the creative proclivities of actors and other participants who have 
little appreciation of legal matters.3 But these explanations are 
incompatible with the competitive environment populated by the 
sophisticated intermediaries who represent talent and their 
counterparties in Hollywood. I account for Hollywood’s contracting 
practices as an efficient adaptation to an environment characterized 
by three salient features: high specification and enforcement costs, 
significant but limited reputational pressures, and high holdup risk 
and outcome uncertainty. These features drive parties to select 
uncertainly enforceable soft contracts over two transactional 
alternatives: more fully formalized and certainly enforceable 
agreements (“hard” contracts) and less formalized and certainly 
unenforceable agreements (“informal” contracts). Whereas hard 
contracts are supported solely by the threat of legal liability and 
informal contracts are supported solely by the threat of reputational 
liability, a soft contract relies on a mix of legal and reputational 
liability to constrain, but not entirely limit, deviations from prior 
commitments.4 
This Article’s argument relies on a novel approach that treats 
contractual formality as a deal term on the negotiating table. Just as 
parties negotiate over the terms of a transaction, parties negotiate 
over the type of instruments used to formalize those terms.5 This 
 
 3. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.  
 4. The concept of “soft contracts” draws on two foundational papers. The first is Victor P. 
Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 45 (1976), which 
analyzes the use of flexible contractual terms to structure the process of adjusting terms in 
response to new information. The second is Benjamin Klein, Why Holdups Occur: The Self-
Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996), which analyzes 
the interaction of reputational and legal enforcement in constraining holdup behavior. Other 
scholars have addressed these issues in the context of innovation markets. See Iva Bozovic & 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations to Support 
Innovation (USC Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. C12–3, 2012) (arguing that formal 
contracts serve as scaffolding to the inherently informal enforcement of contractual relations); 
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and 
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1387–1402 
(2010) (arguing that innovation markets break down the traditional balancing of formal- and 
informal-contracting strategies). 
 5.  As discussed below, other scholars have observed (as is well known to practitioners) 
that parties sometimes intentionally agree upon ambiguous contract terms. See infra note 34. By 
contrast, this Article concerns a strategy in which parties intentionally proceed pursuant to a 
contract whose entire legal existence is ambiguous. For the closest contribution, see generally 
Ricard Gil, The Interplay of Formal and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Movies, 29 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 681 (2011), which argues that distributors and exhibitors in the Spanish film 
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contrasts with the traditional approach in contract scholarship, which 
assumes (usually implicitly) the existence of a binding contract and 
then proceeds to analyze the efficiency of the contract terms. The 
level of formalization matters to transacting parties because it impacts 
the likelihood of legal enforceability, which in turn acts as a proxy for 
the flexibility of the parties’ commitments. Just as parties can achieve 
any preferred level of transactional flexibility through explicit 
contractual terms, they can do so indirectly by calibrating the level of 
formalization used to memorialize those terms. Reducing 
formalization reduces enforceability, which enhances flexibility by 
embedding an implicit termination-and-renegotiation option that 
enables a party to withdraw or adjust contract terms in response to 
information that significantly raises that party’s cost of performance. 
Increasing formalization increases enforceability, which reduces 
flexibility by identifying a set of circumstances in which a 
nonterminating party can credibly threaten legal action in response to 
an announced or threatened withdrawal. So long as a soft contract 
can at least mimic the level of flexibility that could be achieved 
through a more formalized hard contract, the soft contract is the 
preferred option, given that it achieves the same expected outcome 
with lower transaction costs, resulting in a net expected gain. 
I focus on a segment of the film industry where unsigned deals 
are especially prevalent: transactions between studios or other 
production entities6 and higher-value talent (mostly, actors7 and 
directors), commonly known as “stars.”8 I collected evidence through 
 
industry endogenously select the level of contractual formalization, resulting in a hybrid 
contract consisting of a formal agreement modified by an informal commitment to renegotiate 
in response to new information. Id. at 684. 
 6. As used in this Article, “studios” refers to either the small group of major studios that 
have a full range of financing, distribution, and production capacities or the larger group of 
independent production companies that have only production capacities and must seek 
distribution and financing elsewhere, or that have limited in-house distribution and financing 
capacities (a “mini–major” studio). Where necessary, I distinguish between these specific types 
of entities.  
 7. Throughout I use the term “actor” to refer to both male and female performers.  
 8. Existing scholarship on the economics of contracts in the film industry has analyzed 
contracts between distributors and theatrical exhibitors. See Arthur S. De Vany & W. David 
Walls, Bose-Einstein Dynamics and Adaptive Contracting in the Motion Picture Industry, 106 
ECON. J. 1493, 1493–1513 (1996) (modeling distributor–exhibitor agreements with regard to 
information dynamics); Gil, supra note 5. Existing scholarship has also analyzed profit-sharing 
provisions in talent contracts. See Darlene C. Chisholm, Asset Specificity and Long-Term 
Contracts: The Case of the Motion Picture Industry, 19 E. ECON. J. 143, 143–55 (1993) 
(evaluating changes in talent’s contracts in Hollywood from 1929 to 1948 with regard to asset 
specificity and transaction-cost minimization); Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 
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field interviews with industry participants;9 a review of practitioner 
commentary; a survey of over a century’s worth of legal disputes as 
recorded in the digital archives of Daily Variety, the industry’s 
authoritative trade publication; and the opinions and orders of federal 
and state courts. That rich body of evidence supports two 
propositions. First, soft contracts occupy an intermediate region of 
expected enforceability, as compared to hard contracts (which are 
certainly enforceable), and informal contracts (which are certainly 
unenforceable). Second, studios and stars (or their representatives) 
adjust formalization levels to secure parties’ commitments to a film 
project at the lowest transaction-cost burden. In particular, parties 
adjust formalization levels depending on the reputational capital and 
transactional knowledge of their counterparties, the holdup risk at 
any particular stage of a transaction, and the specification costs 
required to formalize any particular element of a transaction. This 
approach accounts for observed differences in formalization levels 
within studio–star transactions, across the larger set of transactions in 
the Hollywood film industry, and, preliminarily, in other markets that 
employ a mix of more and less formalized contractual instruments. 
Far from being imprudent, soft contracts efficiently secure and adjust 
parties’ commitments in high-risk, high-stakes transactions governed 
by significant but limited reputational pressures. 
A complete explanation for soft contracting in Hollywood must 
explain why studios and stars do not use a simpler mechanism to 
secure parties’ commitments: namely, vertical integration. At a one-
time fixed specification cost, the studio could bind talent to a long-
term employment contract and shift all transactions from the 
“market” to the “firm.”10 That would place both parties in a secure 
transactional framework and significantly limit the risk and 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 524, 524–50 (1997) (assessing the benefits of contingent-compensation 
contracts to both studios and talent); Mark Weinstein, Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: 
Evolution and Analysis, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 67–112 (1998) (questioning principal–agent 
explanations for profit-sharing contracts). There is a small practitioner literature on unsigned 
deals in the film industry. See supra note 3.  
 9. The eight interviewees include three senior law-firm partners or counsel with 
entertainment-law practices; four current or former in-house counsel, including two general 
counsels, at two major Hollywood studios and one “mini–major” studio; and a former chief 
executive at a major Hollywood studio. In addition, I conducted informal conversations with 
other entertainment attorneys. Throughout, I use abbreviations to refer to the various 
interviews I conducted with industry participants. For a full list and description of all interviews 
and corresponding abbreviations, see infra App. D. 
 10. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  
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uncertainty to which studio and talent are exposed throughout a film 
production. Hollywood mostly operated under this arrangement 
during the studio-system era that prevailed from the 1920s until its 
erosion in the late 1940s. The dismantling of the studio system, and its 
replacement by a disaggregated network of studios, talent agencies, 
and independent production companies, necessitated alternative 
arrangements by which to secure commitments from external 
suppliers of talent and other inputs to a film production. The result is 
the fluid mix of hard and soft-contracting practices observed in 
Hollywood today. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, I describe the key 
economic characteristics of a motion-picture project. In Part II, I 
detail the key features of soft contracts and present data on the use 
and enforceability of soft contracts in Hollywood from the early 
twentieth century through the present. In Part III, I propose an 
economic rationale for soft contracting. In Part IV, I apply that 
rationale to account for observed tendencies in Hollywood 
contracting practices. In Part V, I examine how soft contracting may 
have displaced vertical integration as the primary transactional 
structure for talent–studio relationships in Hollywood. In Part VI, I 
discuss soft-contracting practices outside Hollywood and the 
normative implications of this phenomenon for contract law in 
general. 
I.  HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS 
Three features of the Hollywood film industry are especially 
salient from an economic perspective: (1) the high stakes, extreme 
risk, and contracting hazards of a film project; (2) the longevity and 
dominance of a small group of major studios; and (3) the persistence 
of the “star” vehicle in the labor market for acting and directorial 
talent. As I explain below, the latter two features derive from the 
first. 
A. Why Only Fools Invest in Movies 
Making a movie is far from an economically certain proposition, 
for three principal reasons: the capital requirements tend to be high, 
the odds of success are slim, and the contracting hazards are 
formidable. These factors provide the basis for identifying the 
economic rationale behind Hollywood’s peculiar contracting 
practices. 
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1. High Stakes and Extreme Uncertainty.  A substantial 
investment is typically at stake in a motion-picture production. The 
Motion Picture Association of America reported that in 2007, major-
studio films had average production and distribution costs of $106.6 
million.11 Recent blockbuster films have had production and 
distribution budgets as high as $410 million. For example, Disney’s 
Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides, which was released in 
2011, reportedly incurred production costs of $410 million.12 
Compounding matters, any investor’s likelihood of earning a positive 
return on a particular film is slim. A striking illustration of this risk is 
John Carter, a major “flop” resulting in an estimated loss to Disney of 
$200 million.13 Any movie is akin to a gamble with long odds: a few 
hits succeed spectacularly, while the remainder consists of flops that 
generate meager or no profits. This disparity in outcomes is dramatic. 
Out of a sample of 2,015 movies released in the North American 
market between 1984 and 1996, only 22 percent of releases were 
profitable; and 6.3 percent of all the movies earned 80 percent of the 
total profits.14 No known metric exists by which to predict the 
likelihood of success or failure for a given film.15 This is sometimes 
known as the “nobody knows” property.16 
 
 11. Richard Verrier, MPAA Stops Disclosing Average Costs of Making and Marketing 
Movies, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/01/business/fi-cotown-
mpaa1. In industry terminology, “production and distribution cost” refers to both the “negative 
cost,” the cost of production, and prints and ads, or “P&A,” which primarily includes the costs 
of advertising and making prints for theatrical exhibition. 
 12. Christian Sylt, Fourth Pirates of the Caribbean Is Most Expensive Movie Ever with 
Costs of $410 Million, FORBES (July 22, 2014, 4:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/csylt/2014/07/22/fourth-pirates-of-the-caribbean-is-most-expensive-movie-ever-with-costs-
of-410-million.  
 13. Paul Bond, ‘John Carter’ Will Cost Disney $200 Million in Operating Losses, 
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 19, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/john-
carter-cost-disney-millions-301704. 
 14. Arthur S. De Vany & W. David Walls, Motion Picture Profit, the Stable Paretian 
Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar, 28 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1035, 1039–40 
(2004). For this purpose, the authors defined “profit” to mean revenues minus capital, interest, 
overhead, advertising, and other costs. Id. at 1039. 
 15. See ARTHUR S. DE VANY, HOLLYWOOD ECONOMICS: HOW EXTREME UNCERTAINTY 
SHAPES THE FILM INDUSTRY 75–76, 84–89 (2004). 
 16. The phrase is derived from a statement by screenwriter William Goldwyn: “NOBODY 
KNOWS ANYTHING. Not one person in the entire motion picture field knows for a certainty 
what’s going to work.” WILLIAM GOLDWYN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE: A 
PERSONAL VIEW OF HOLLYWOOD AND SCREENWRITING 39 (1983). 
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2. Holdup Risk.  A film project proceeds along an extended 
multiyear timeline starting with idea conception and running through 
release at the box office. At various points, parties must make what 
institutional economists call “specific” investments in the project—
that is, investments that have a lower value (or no value) in any 
alternative use—before having any reliable information as to the 
likely commercial outcome. Specific investments trigger exposure to 
holdup behavior by counterparties, subject to reputational and legal 
constraints. Once one party has made a sunk investment in the film 
project, the non-investing party can extract value from the investing 
party by refusing to perform its side of the bargain, subject to 
renegotiation of the project’s terms to the non-investing party’s 
advantage.17 This concept can be illustrated more concretely in the 
entertainment context as follows. Assume a studio has started 
production on a movie and has agreed by contract to compensate its 
lead star with $1 million in cash and 5 percent of the gross box-office 
revenues. After one month during which the studio has incurred 
significant production costs, the lead star announces that he is 
dissatisfied with the director’s performance and threatens to quit. In 
negotiations, the star’s representative suggests that his client may 
revise his opinion of the director’s performance if the star’s 
compensation were increased to $1.5 million in cash and 10 percent of 
the gross box-office revenues. Ignoring any potential effects on the 
studio’s exposure to opportunistic renegotiation in future projects, 
the studio will agree so long as its expected incremental costs of 
obtaining the services of an equivalent-value star, including any delay 
to the production schedule and associated losses, less any expected 
amount recoverable through litigation against the talent (net of legal 
fees), would exceed the additional compensation being demanded by 
the star. 
3. Multiple Inputs.  A film project is transactionally complex, 
which inflates its ex ante contracting costs and, in the event of breach, 
 
 17. See Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, 
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 308 (1978) 
(demonstrating how opportunistic postcontractual incentives to renegotiate based upon changes 
in the automotive-parts industry led to vertical integration rather than reliance on long-term 
contracts). See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) (describing how a non-investing party may span both sides of 
a transaction and thus subordinate and pressure the other party into accepting renegotiated 
terms). 
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ex post enforcement costs. The production entity must combine goods 
and services supplied by hundreds of different entities and 
individuals. The core inputs include (1) financing; (2) production; 
(3) creative talent; (4) technical personnel; (5) pre-release marketing; 
(6) theatrical exhibition; and (7) post-release distribution such as 
home video, the internet, and television. These inputs can be 
obtained either internally within a single firm or externally through 
the market. As shown below, in Hollywood’s current industrial 
structure, external market-based sourcing predominates and is 
universally the case with respect to talent. 
Figure 1. The Transactional Structure of a Hollywood Film Project 
 
B. Why Studios Exist: The Inevitability of Scale 
Since the start of Hollywood, a small group of major studios has 
held remarkably consistent market shares. In 2011, the six major 
studios (Sony Pictures, 20th Century Fox, Walt Disney, Paramount, 
Warner Bros., and Universal) accounted for 81.2 percent of gross 
domestic box-office revenues;18 in 1939, five major studios and three 
smaller studios released 85 percent of the feature films released that 
year.19 The widespread belief that these high concentration levels can 
be attributed to high entry barriers misses a more fundamental 
point.20 The scale and scope of the Hollywood studio are means by 
 
 18. Ray Subers, Paramount Wins 2011 Studio Battle, BOX OFFICE MOJO (Jan. 11, 2012), 
http://boxofficemojo.com/news/?id=3345. 
 19. See MAE D. HUETTING, ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY: A 
STUDY IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 84, 87 (1944). 
 20. See generally DEAN ALGER, HOW GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS MEDIA, 
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which to fund the high costs, and spread the high risks, of film 
production. A Hollywood studio does not primarily “make movies”; 
rather, it is primarily a vehicle for coordinating the inputs required to 
assemble a film as well as for financing, marketing, and distributing 
films produced by internal production divisions and independent 
production entities. By holding a diversified portfolio of projects and 
maintaining a library of past successes, the studio can generate a 
sufficient number of “hits” and revenue streams to make up for losses 
on the far greater number of “flops.” The importance of that 
diversification function is illustrated by the fact that even critically 
successful independent production companies face chronic financial 
difficulties and often declare insolvency or are acquired by a major 
studio.21 
C. Star Power 
The star vehicle has been a consistent feature of the movie 
industry over virtually its entire history.22 In 1919, the commercial 
power of Charlie Chaplin, a star director and performer, was so great 
that he founded his own production company, United Artists, 
together with fellow stars Douglas Fairbanks, Mary Pickford, and 
D.W. Griffith.23 The persistence of the star vehicle can be explained 
through reference to two mechanisms. First, high-quality, low-cost 
reproduction technologies create “winner-take-all” effects that 
disproportionately drive market rents to the most highly valued 
performers.24 Second, consumers mitigate consumption risk by using a 
star as an imperfect indicator of movie quality, which drives 
producers, distributors, and financiers to use that same variable as a 
 
consideration should be given to the scale of big corporate media studios and the extent to 
which they provide diversified information); BEN BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 
(2004) (same); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) (same). 
 21. See THOMAS D. SELZ, MELVIN SIMENSKY, PATRICIA ACTON & ROBERT LIND, 
ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES §§ 1.8, 2.3 (3d ed. 2009); 
Barbara Boyle, The Independent Spirit, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 176 (Jason Squire ed., 
3d ed. 2004).  
 22. See Gorham Kindem, Hollywood’s Movie Star System: A Historical Overview, in THE 
AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY: THE BUSINESS OF MOTION PICTURES 79–93 (Gorham Kindem 
ed., 1982) (tracing the role of the Hollywood star from the 1910s to the 1970s). 
 23. 1 TINO BALIO, UNITED ARTISTS, 1919-1950: THE COMPANY BUILT BY THE STARS 12–
13 (2009). 
 24. See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 845–58 
(1981) (modeling talent in the context of income distribution).  
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proxy for a film’s likelihood of success.25 Both factors explain why 
major feature films typically cannot be financed without a “bankable” 
star cast or director, and why industry participants closely follow 
rankings of star value.26 Actors and directors in the upper echelon of 
those rankings represent a scarce asset for which studios compete 
vigorously, while all others are virtually a commodity good. The 
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that, in 2010, of the nearly one 
hundred thousand members of the Screen Actors Guild (the actors’ 
union), only about fifty earned extraordinarily high incomes, while 
most others earned meager salaries and were unemployed for long 
periods of time.27 Other evidence confirms this extreme disparity in 
talent’s fortunes. For the period from 1993 to 1995, only fifty-eight 
directors directed more than one feature film released by a major 
studio, and only three directors directed at least three such films;28 for 
that same period, 79.5 percent of all actors who acted in any film 
acted in only one film;29 and, for the period from 1995 to 2001, only 
 
 25. The extent to which the presence of a star improves the likelihood of a successful 
release remains unresolved. Using a sample of two thousand films released from 1984 to 1996, 
an empirical study finds that, on average, a star significantly increases the least revenue a movie 
may earn (that is, a star constrains the lower tail portion of the revenue distribution) and slightly 
increases a movie’s chance of making a profit, in each case relative to a movie without a star. See 
DE VANY, supra note 15, at 87–88. This is consistent with findings that actors positively impact 
opening performance. Anita Elberse, The Power of Stars: Do Star Actors Drive the Success of 
Movies?, 71 J. MARKETING 102, 118 (2007).  
 26. Recently released rankings include the “Ulmer Scale,” a list of the industry’s top 1400 
actors ranked by “bankability,” or the ability to raise “100% or majority financing” for a movie, 
Ulmer Scale: Welcome, THE ULMER SCALE, http://www.ulmerscale.com/aboutUS.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2014), the Internet Movie Database’s “StarMeter” list, based on the search 
behavior of users of the “IMDb.com” website, a leading online source of information in the film 
industry, Year in Review—STARmeter Top 10 of 2011, IMDb, http://www.imdb.com/
oscars/year-in-review/starmeter-top-10-of-2011 (last updated June 13, 2013), Esquire’s “Box 
Office Power” list, based on box-office revenues, as weighted by various criteria, Matthew 
Shepatin, Who’s the Most Bankable Star in Hollywood?, ESQUIRE (May 27, 2008, 8:27 AM), 
http://www.esquire.com/the-side/feature/box-office-power-052308, and Forbes’ “Star Currency” 
list, based on industry surveys, Star Currency Celebrity Rankings, FORBES, 
http://www.forbes.com/starcurrency (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR & STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK 
HANDBOOK 2010-11 LIBRARY EDITION, at 320 (Jan. 2010), available at http://en.calameo
.com/read/000763400c8731e6cfd86. 
 28. Ezra Zuckerman, Do Firms and Markets Look Different? Repeat Collaboration in the 
Motion Picture Industry, 1935-1995, at 9 (MIT Sloan School of Management, Working Paper, 
2004). The three directors referred to above are John Badham, Oliver Stone, and Joel 
Schumacher. Id. 
 29. Id. at 10.  
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thirty-six actors appeared in two or more hit films (defined as a film 
that grossed $100 million or more).30 
II.  HOLLYWOOD CONTRACTING 
Scholars have observed—and business lawyers would not be 
surprised to learn—that parties use strategic ambiguity in drafting 
contracts.31 Other scholars have identified settings in which parties 
appear to deliberately use legally unenforceable documentation,32 
entering into preliminary agreements that set forth some, but not all, 
of the terms of a proposed transaction.33 But scholars have not yet 
recognized that parties are sometimes strategic about whether they 
are creating an enforceable contract.34 Standard business-law practice 
is to take special care to avoid this predicament.35 Certainly, operating 
in a gray area of potentially enforceable agreements may appear to be 
 
 30. DE VANY, supra note 15, at 243–45. 
 31. See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case 
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 848–924 (2010) (explaining the benefits of vague 
language in acquisition contracts); George S. Geis, An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite 
Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1664–1719 (2006) (explaining the strategic use of vague 
language in contracts generally). 
 32. See Arnoud W.A. Boot, Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Reputation and 
Discretion in Financial Contracting, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1165, 1165–83 (1993) (describing the 
effects of discretionary contracts on reputational capital); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in 
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 373–467 (1990) (analyzing parties’ reliance 
on nonlegal sanctions to enforce agreements); Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? 
The GM-Fisher Body Contract, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1071, 1071–84 (2008) (evaluating 
one instance of intentional use of non–legally enforceable contracting); Friedrich Kessler, 
Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1135–90 
(1957) (describing the invalidation of franchise contracts due to indefiniteness); Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 
55–67 (1963) (detailing the success of non–legally enforceable arrangements in manufacturing); 
Ronald Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2494, 
2494–2536 (2000) (describing unenforceable credit agreements); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of 
Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641–96 (2003) (identifying 
reciprocal fairness as a source of indefinite agreements). 
 33. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary 
Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 661–707 (2007) (providing a model to explain preliminary 
agreements, their breach, and errors in court enforcement); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to 
Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 389–428 
(2004) (proposing partial enforcement for partially definite contracts).  
 34. The possibility that parties may deliberately choose ambiguous levels of legal 
enforceability is mentioned in passing in Scott, supra note 32, at 1685 n.172.  
 35. See Joseph M. Perillo, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: 
The Black Letter Text and a Review, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 281, 287 (1994) (“Within the 
common law system, most legal professionals . . . staunchly cling to the supreme value of 
certainty of result.”). 
BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2014  10:34 PM 
618 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:605 
imprudent for both client and attorney. Yet Hollywood appears to 
feel otherwise. 
A. Conventional Contracting 
The timeline of a conventional transaction is depicted below. 
First, after some initial discussion, the parties enter into a preliminary 
agreement, often called a “memorandum of understanding” or “letter 
of intent,” which describes the basic terms of the proposed 
transaction and usually states that the document is nonbinding.36 
Negotiation of detailed terms and legal and financial diligence then 
proceeds simultaneously. If the process advances sufficiently, the 
parties negotiate, draft, and execute a package of final agreements, 
and finally close the deal (in a discrete transaction) or undertake 
other forms of performance (in a “relationship” transaction). In this 
conventional sequence, there is a clear demarcation between the 
negotiation period, in which there is no risk of contractual liability, 
and the performance period, in which there is clear contractual 
liability. Once the deal is executed, the parties commence 
performance under the assurance that all subsequent investments are 
governed by contractual terms that can be enforced in court. 
Figure 2. The Conventional Deal 
 
B. Hollywood Contracting 
The high risk of commercial failure, combined with the holdup 
risk inherent in sequential investment and the disaggregated structure 
of the film industry, accounts for what the Hollywood press calls the 
 
 36. Exceptions to the “no liability” disclaimers are sometimes made with respect to 
confidentiality provisions or, in an acquisition transaction, “no shop” provisions barring the 
target firm from seeking bids from other acquirers. For further discussion, see RALPH B. LAKE 
& UGO DRAETTA, LETTERS OF INTENT AND OTHER PRECONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FORMS 15–16 (2d ed. Supp. 1996) (discussing enforcement of, 
and good-faith obligations in, agreements to negotiate).  
Closing 
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“waiting game.”37 The studio or outside investor is not willing to 
commit to a project until the star is signed up, the star is not willing to 
commit until the investor is signed up, and the distributor is not 
willing to commit until both the star and investor are signed up.38 To 
partially address this problem, Hollywood has developed a rich menu 
of time-limited option contracts that condition performance 
obligations on the occurrence of specified triggering events.39 For 
example, a studio typically acquires a screenplay from a writer in 
exchange for an initial acquisition fee and the option to purchase the 
screenplay for an additional fee within a certain period.40 In certain 
transactions, however, Hollywood does business differently. Rather 
than conditioning performance on the execution of a contract, or 
breaking up performance into stages on the basis of conditions 
precedent, the parties use what appears to be a cruder device. Talent 
and studios, among others, often commence performance under 
imperfectly specified obligations set forth in a mix of oral 
communications, email exchanges, letters, and unsigned draft 
contracts. In these unsigned deals, it is unclear when legal liability 
commences or ends. 
1. The Unsigned Deal.  The typical sequence of an unsigned deal 
between a studio and a star actor is depicted below. A Daily Variety 
article summarizes this sequence: First, an actor’s agent or attorney 
makes an oral agreement with the studio. Next, the parties exchange 
a deal memo. Then “reams of paperwork” (meaning, draft long-form 
agreements) are exchanged. Finally, in rare cases, the long-form 
agreement is finalized and signed.41 The deal memo, which is often or 
usually left unexecuted,42 typically sets forth key terms such as the 
 
 37. See, e.g., Kevin Jagernauth, Will the Waiting Game for J.J. Abrams Cause “Star Trek 2” 
to Move From Summer to Winter 2012?, INDIEWIRE (May 24, 2011, 11:22 AM), http://blogs
.indiewire.com/theplaylist/archives/will_the_waiting_game_for_j.j._abrams_cause_star_trek_2_t
o_move_from. 
 38. See ALEXANDRA BROUWER & THOMAS LEE WRIGHT, WORKING IN HOLLYWOOD 50 
(1990) (noting that studios are wary of committing to a movie until the talent package has been 
fully assembled); BASTIAN CLEVÉ, FILM PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 108 (2d ed. 2000) 
(explaining that producers wait as long as possible to enter into contracts that “lock them into 
fixed starting dates”). 
 39. For a full review, see generally SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ: THE BASIC BUSINESS, 
LEGAL AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY (4th ed. 2011). 
 40. Id. at 199–200.  
 41. See Double Trouble Irks Legal Eagles, DAILY VARIETY, July 14, 1997. 
 42. According to three interviewees, the deal memo is typically not signed. Telephone 
Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, in L.A., Cal. (May 31, 2011); Telephone Interview with 
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fixed compensation (and, in some cases, a “pay-or-play” commitment 
guaranteeing payment even if talent’s services are not used); the 
actor’s role; screen credit;43 and, in summary form, the talent’s 
contingent compensation based on the film’s performance.44 Before 
the start of shooting, studios generally insist that talent execute a 
“certificate of engagement” assigning to the studio all intellectual-
property rights in talent’s contribution to the project.45 As shown 
below, three outcomes may result: the contract is executed during 
shooting;46 the contract is executed after shooting has been 
completed;47 or the contract is continuously negotiated—becoming a 
so-called “creeping contract”48—but is never executed, remaining in 
draft form.49 
 
Entm’t Attorney III, in L.A., Cal. (Apr. 9, 2013); Interview with Studio Exec., in L.A., Cal. 
(Apr. 16, 2013).  
 43. This refers to the manner in which the talent’s role will be reflected in the “credits,” 
including credits that appear in the motion picture and credits that appear in promotional 
materials. Parties contract over the prominence of the credit—in particular, placement and font 
size. See RICHARD CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND 
COMMERCE 126–27 (2000) 
 44. For further discussion, see infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text.  
 45. Interview with Studio Counsel II, in L.A., Cal. (Mar. 2013); Telephone Interview with 
Studio Counsel III, in L.A. Cal. (Aug. 29, 2011); Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, 
supra note 42. 
 46. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42 (providing examples 
of a talent contract being executed at shooting); Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, 
supra note 45 (same). 
 47. See Harrison J. Dossick, Resolving Disputes over Oral and Unsigned Film Agreements, 
L.A. LAWYER, Apr. 1999; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42. 
 48. See Dossick, supra note 47. 
 49. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 8, 2011); Interview 
with Mini–Major Studio Counsel, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 2011); Telephone Interview with Entm’t 
Attorney III, supra note 42. 
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Figure 3. The “Unsigned Deal” 
 
2. Evidence on Soft-Contracting Practices in General.  To 
understand more precisely the extent to which soft-contracting 
practices are used in the film industry, I undertook four types of 
empirical inquiry: (1) I comprehensively surveyed the relevant 
practitioner literature; (2) I conducted interviews with different types 
of legal and business practitioners in the field;50 (3) I reviewed all of 
the digital archives of Daily Variety, one of the industry’s two leading 
trade journals, dating from the start of the film industry to the 
present;51 and (4) I comprehensively surveyed the relevant litigation 
in all federal courts, California state courts, and New York state 
courts. All of these sources confirmed my general impression that 
unsigned deals are common throughout the industry. Such unsigned 
agreements include deals between studios and talent;52 studios and 
individual producers;53 independent production companies and 
studio–distributors;54 independent production companies and foreign 
 
 50. For all information on interviews, see infra App. D.  
 51. The other leading trade journal is The Hollywood Reporter. I relied primarily on Daily 
Variety because it provides online access to all of its prior publications through a subscription-
based digital archive. 
 52. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, in L.A., Cal. (June 2, 2011); 
Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42; 
Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Mini–Major 
Studio Counsel, supra note 49. 
 53. See Linda Rapportoni, Former Uni ‘Deal-Maker’ Testifies in ‘Pirates’ Trial, DAILY 
VARIETY, June 6, 1991; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42. 
 54. See JOHN W. CONES, THE FEATURE FILM DISTRIBUTION DEAL 35 (1997) (providing 
an example of a deal between an independent production company and a studio-distributor); 
Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52. 
Unsigned “Deal Memo” 











Certificate of Engagement 
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distributors;55 talent and agents;56 talent and managers;57 and 
entertainment companies and merchandisers.58  In a brief filed by the 
major studio Warner Bros. in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, the studio asserted that “many business deals are never 
formalized” in the entertainment industry and that it is “standard” for 
parties to commence performance without a formalized contract.59 
Consistent with these assertions, a Los Angeles County Superior 
Court judge observed that “[m]otion picture development and 
production operates in a unique business universe . . . . Multi-million 
dollar film projects are developed and completed (or cancelled) on 
the basis of loose, artistic understandings without written, signed 
contracts.”60 
3. Evidence on Deals Between Studios and Stars.  Unsigned deals 
are most consistently used in the case of talent–studio transactions 
and, in particular, in deals involving higher-value talent (or “stars”).61 
I therefore chose to focus on that segment in conducting a more 
detailed empirical inquiry. Consistent with evidence produced in 
litigation,62 interviewees reported that talent–studio agreements are 
 
 55. See Coudert Bros. LLP, Industry Custom & Practice: The Important [sic] of Arbitration 
Clauses in International Entertainment Contracts, FINDLAW.COM (Mar. 26, 2008), http://
library.findlaw.com/1998/Jan/1/126624.html (providing an overview of the deal-making process 
between domestic production companies and foreign distributors). 
 56. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42. 
 57. See Ricardo Cestero, Managers vs. Talent, or When BFFs Turn Nasty, L. L. LAND 
(Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2010/04/managers_vs_talent_or_when_bff.html 
(discussing the recent rise in legal disputes between managers and talent). 
 58. See PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 877, 880 (Ct. App. 1996) (suit 
brought by a manufacturer against the holder of “The Mighty Morphin Power Rangers” 
copyright over disputed licensing agreement). 
 59. Principal and Response Brief of Cross-Appellants and Appellees Warner Bros. 
Entertainment Inc. and DC Comics at 3, 28, Larson v. Warner Bros., 504 F. App’x 586 (2012) 
(Nos. 11-5863, 11-56034). 
 60. See Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. B126903 at 10–11 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2001), 
available at http://www.schleimerlaw.com/CourtAppealCoppola.htm (concerning a contract 
dispute between director Francis Ford Coppola and Warner Bros.). 
 61. See Stephen M. Kravit, Business Affairs, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 197 (Jason 
Squire ed., 3d ed. 2004); Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42; 
Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Studio 
Counsel III, supra note 45; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. 
 62. In a suit between then-star Kim Basinger and an independent production company, the 
court found that Basinger had acted in all but two of her previous nine films without a signed 
contract. See Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1994). The court observed that “film industry contracts are frequently oral agreements 
based on unsigned ‘deal memos.’” Id. Likewise, in a suit between Francis Ford Coppola and 
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often not memorialized in fully negotiated long-form documentation 
and, for part or all of the transactional timeline, proceed on the basis 
of some combination of incompletely formalized instruments: oral 
commitments, deal memos,63 draft long-form agreements64 or letters,65 
email exchanges, and other informal communication.66  
Different studios and law firms appear to follow slightly different 
variations of this practice, which in turn could be adjusted to serve the 
needs of a particular project. In-house counsel reported that the 
studio will typically “green light” a project based on incompletely 
specified communications with talent attorneys and a mutual 
understanding to subsequently negotiate and draft a fully executed 
long-form agreement.67 A studio executive reported that the studio 
sometimes commences shooting without a signed agreement but 
identifies, in its comments to outstanding drafts, the points that it 
considers to be unresolved.68 In other cases, studio lawyers send a 
“reliance letter” indicating that an agreement had been reached 
based on the last negotiation draft (and that the negotiator’s client is 
relying on that belief), which may in turn prompt a “counter-reliance 
letter” from the talent’s attorney.69 In the atypical case of a successful 
release, these dueling drafts can even play a role in postproduction 
accounting disputes over contingent-compensation provisions (known 
 
Warner Bros., the court found that Coppola, a world-famous director, had not entered into a 
signed contract in directing two previous films for the studio. Coppola, supra note 60. 
 63. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Interview with Studio 
Exec., supra note 42. This is consistent with the views expressed in Michael S. Bogner, Note, 
The Problem with Handshakes: An Evaluation of Oral Agreements in the United States Film 
Industry, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 359, 363 (2004). 
 64. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42. 
 65. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. 
 66. For further discussion, see DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF 
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES § 2.4 (4th ed. 2006); MARK LITWAK, REEL POWER: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR INFLUENCE AND SUCCESS IN THE NEW HOLLYWOOD 160–61 (1994). Another 
interviewee described the process in more detail: The talent attorney initially agrees on a deal 
with the studio’s “business affairs” department, which sends a deal memo to the agent (without 
requesting a signature) and the studio’s legal-affairs department. The legal-affairs department is 
then instructed to “work out” a long-form agreement with the talent’s attorney. Telephone 
Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42. For similar accounts, see Interview with Mini–
Major Studio Counsel, supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel I, supra note 49; 
Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, 
supra note 45; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Telephone 
Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. 
 67. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45.  
 68. See id.; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42.  
 69. See Dossick, supra note 47. 
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in the industry as “participation rights”); in fact, a cottage industry of 
auditing firms reportedly specializes in this practice.70 Though the 
level of formalization used differs among different projects and 
different studios, it is clear that Hollywood studios and stars regularly 
enter into commercially significant undertakings in the absence of a 
fully formalized set of agreements. 
C. Are Soft Contracts Legally Enforceable? 
Do Hollywood’s soft contracts give rise to a meaningful threat of 
legal liability? In a word, yes. As a matter of California and New 
York law (the two most relevant jurisdictions for the American 
entertainment industry), unsigned deals give rise to some prospect of 
contractual or other liability. As compared to a fully specified and 
executed long-form document, however, these forms of agreement 
impose liability with reduced certainty. 
1. The Indefiniteness Doctrine.  Because Hollywood’s soft 
contracts are often characterized by incomplete levels of specificity, it 
is important to understand the extent to which courts will enforce a 
contract that does not explicitly set forth all terms. Historically, courts 
have required mutual agreement over all essential terms.71  On that 
basis, courts sometimes declined to enforce “agreements to agree” or 
other preliminary or incompletely specified agreements.72 Current law 
is more equivocal. Courts are sometimes willing to “fill in gaps” based 
on a reasonableness criterion, which restores contractual 
completeness and can potentially support a damages award.73 Far less 
 
 70. Discussion with Accountant Specializing in the Entertainment Industry, L.A., Cal. 
(Sept. 2011). The absence of a signed agreement sometimes leads to litigation concerning the 
calculation of “net profit” compensation—that is, the portion of the “net profits” owing to 
talent after the studio has recovered its “costs” relating to the motion picture, in each case as the 
relevant term is defined in relevant documentation exchanged between the parties—or to 
litigation concerning other related issues. See, e.g., Hermit’s Glen Prods. Inc. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., No. BC147241, 1997 WL 302292 (L.A. Sup. Ct. 1997) (concerning a 
lawsuit filed by the writer–producer of the film White Men Can’t Jump, against a studio, over an 
alleged breach of an oral agreement entitling him to a percentage of the film’s gross receipts). 
 71. See Ian Ayres, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 106 (1999) (referring to “the common law rule that indefinite contracts 
are not enforceable”). 
 72. E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221 (1987). 
 73. For the most comprehensive empirical account of existing case law, see Scott, supra 
note 32. 
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frequently, courts may imply an agreement to negotiate in good faith74 
or, even without sufficient mutuality, may award reduced damages on 
equitable grounds such as promissory estoppel or unjust enrichment.75 
Sophisticated parties can eliminate exposure to precontractual and 
extracontractual liability by stating up front that any preliminary 
communications are nonbinding. This simple prophylactic is standard 
practice in other business settings76 and proves effective when tested 
in court.77 But this simple precaution is apparently not consistently 
undertaken in talent–studio transactions—as illustrated by talent– 
studio disputes over the existence of a binding agreement, a question 
that would be moot in the presence of such a disclaimer. Effectively, 
entertainment lawyers are choosing not to fully opt out of a legal 
regime that can impose liability by the unpredictable fiat of a judge or 
jury. 
2. The Writing Requirement.  Because Hollywood’s soft contracts 
are often communicated at least partly in oral form, it is important to 
understand the extent to which courts will enforce oral agreements. 
Under the common law, oral agreements are enforceable so long as 
they satisfy the consideration and mutuality requirements that are 
always a precondition for contractual enforceability. State and federal 
statutes of frauds may also impose an additional writing requirement. 
In California and New York, any contract that cannot be performed 
within one year of its “making” must be in writing and executed by 
 
 74. See SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmaAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 351–52 (Del. 2013) 
(establishing a right to seek damages for certain breaches of an agreement to negotiate in good 
faith); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498–99 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same). 
 75. For the classic example of promissory estoppel as a ground for extracontractual 
damages, see Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276–77 (Wis. 1965). For an 
example of an award of damages under the quasi-contractual theory of unjust enrichment when 
the underlying verbal contract was unenforceable under the applicable statute of frauds, see 
Earhart v. William Low Co., 25 Cal.3d 503, 514 (1979). 
 76. LAKE, supra note 36, at 65; see Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and Courtship: 
Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 404, 478 (1999) 
(describing American courts’ reliance on the parties’ express disclaimers in such precontractual 
instruments). 
 77. See Rennick HHC v. O.P.T.I.O.N. Care, Inc., 77 F.3d 309, 317–18 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(declining to enforce a “handshake” deal because other written communications included 
disclaimers of any legal liability before execution of a final written agreement); see also R.G. 
Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart, Co., 751 F.2d 69, 74 (Cal. 1984) (refusing to enforce an agreement 
that included all material terms because it stated that the parties did not intend any legal 
liability until the execution of a complete written agreement). 
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the party against whom enforcement is sought.78 A writing is useful to 
a studio-plaintiff under California law, which provides that, in 
personal-services contracts, negative injunctive relief—that is, an 
order preventing the talent-defendant from working for another 
employer during the term of the agreement in dispute—is available 
only if the writing requirement is satisfied.79 The federal copyright 
statute provides that any exclusive transfer of a copyright interest 
must be in writing, broadly defined,80 to be valid.81 Curiously, studios 
and stars—who are all represented by sophisticated parties—
nonetheless enter into incompletely formalized agreements that 
forfeit or endanger these legal advantages. 
D. Are Soft Contracts Practically Enforceable? 
This Section considers the extent to which soft contracts are 
likely to give rise to legal liability as a practical matter. As discussed 
below, soft contracts occupy an intermediate region between clearly 
enforceable and clearly unenforceable promissory communications. 
Without some reasonable anticipation of being held enforceable, soft 
contracts would exert no deterrent force, hold no settlement value for 
a potential plaintiff, impose few if any dispute-resolution costs on a 
potential defendant, and largely overlap with certainly unenforceable 
reputational agreements. Without some reasonable anticipation of 
not being held enforceable, soft contracts would largely overlap with 
certainly enforceable formal agreements. 
1. Litigation Behavior: Case Law and Trade-Press Survey.  To 
gain insight into litigation behavior, I surveyed the digital archives of 
 
 78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(1) (West 2014); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. L. § 5-701 (McKinney 
2014). 
 79. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 2014). 
 80. The Ninth Circuit has stated that, for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012), the writing 
can be “a one-line pro forma statement.” Effects Assoc. Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th 
Cir. 1999). Additionally, the writing need not contain any particular language. Radio-Television 
Espanola S.A. v. New World Entm’t, Ltd., 183 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, the writing 
can even be executed after the alleged transfer. Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 
1429 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). This explains why, in transactions that are otherwise 
undocumented, the studio obtains a certificate of engagement from an actor or director even if 
the long-form agreement remains unsigned. The certificate of engagement transfers to the 
studio all copyright and other intellectual-property interests that talent may have in the motion 
picture or any derivative works. For further discussion, see Part IV.C.2.a. Interviewees reported 
that studios regularly insist on signing a definitive agreement with a screenwriter, perhaps due 
to the lack of any ambiguity over whether the screenwriter’s contribution may be copyrighted. 
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Daily Variety and the Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis case-law databases for 
reports of contract-formation disputes between a studio and talent 
(meaning an actor, director, or writer) involving an actual or 
proposed film project.82 I identified a total of sixty-nine reported 
“unsigned deal” disputes from the inception of the Hollywood film 
industry through the present, all of which involved some formal legal 
action. All but two arose after the end of the studio system, which this 
Article dates to the year 1947. From 1947 through July 2014, there has 
been on average slightly more than one reported talent–studio lawsuit 
per year concerning contract formation. Although both the total 
number of informal disputes and the total number of actual and 
proposed film projects are unknown, it can be safely asserted that 
studio and talent bear some meaningful legal exposure as a result of 
terminating involvement in a project with respect to which the parties 
have expressed a sufficiently firm commitment. 
2. Litigation Outcomes: Case-Law Survey.  I used the Lexis-Nexis 
and Westlaw case-law databases to identify reported decisions 
involving disputes between talent and a studio or other production 
entity concerning the enforceability of oral agreements, deal 
memoranda, draft agreements, and other incompletely specified or 
unexecuted agreements relating to a film or television project.83 I 
surveyed the entire period from the date of each database’s 
inception84 through July 2014 in all federal courts and all New York 
and California state courts. Additionally, I surveyed the period from 
January 1980 to July 2014 for all other state courts.85 Appendix A 
 
 82. For this purpose, I targeted disputes over the existence of a legally binding agreement 
between studio and talent, but excluded disputes with respect to a particular term of an 
agreement that the parties otherwise recognized as having been duly formed.  
 83. I included cases relating to the television industry in this survey on the assumption that 
judicial rulings concerning unsigned deals in television would influence expectations of parties 
transacting with respect to a film project. I excluded cases involving “idea submission” disputes, 
usually involving claims by a writer or producer that a network, studio or other production 
company used an idea that had been pitched to the network or studio. See infra App. A for 
further description of the data-inclusion criteria and sources. 
 84. The relevant Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw databases used in this search cover federal, New 
York and California law from the date on which each respective jurisdiction was established. As 
a practical matter, the search could obviously have located only cases decided since the start of 
the commercial film industry in the United States. The first commercial motion-picture 
exhibition in the United States took place in 1894 (the Edison Vitascope projection system).  
See DOUGLAS GOMERY, SHARED PLEASURES: A HISTORY OF MOVIE PRESENTATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (1992). 
 85. For purposes of surveying other state courts’ decisions, I selected a shorter time period 
for reasons of manageability. On a separate point, it would be useful to learn whether any such 
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provides a complete list of all identified cases, a summary of relevant 
facts and holdings, and sources used. 
a. Results.  Not surprisingly, fully litigated cases rarely occur in 
this context. I have identified only thirty-nine such decisions for the 
entire period from the earliest reported decisions through July 2014 
(all but two of which were issued after 1947). Of the thirty-nine cases, 
the courts declined to recognize a valid contract in twenty-eight—that 
is, almost 72 percent of the time, the court found that no contract 
existed. Assuming that more fully specified or more completely 
executed agreements are substantially more likely to be enforced, and 
less fully specified or less completely executed agreements are 
substantially less likely to be enforced, a soft contract represents a 
meaningful transactional alternative between the options of a purely 
formal or purely informal contract.86 The distribution of outcomes, 
and underlying grounds for nonenforcement, are summarized in 
Table 1 below: 
 
disputes are resolved by arbitration, which is currently the typical dispute-resolution procedure 
in Hollywood. I doubt, however, whether this would convey significant additional information. 
First, my trade-press review identified only a single reported contract-formation dispute 
between studio and talent that was resolved by arbitration. See App. A. Second, it is not clear 
that arbitration is typically available in contract-formation disputes between studio and talent. 
The “Basic Agreement,” which governs relationships between talent and any production entity 
that is a signatory to the collective-bargaining agreement with the Screen Actors Guild 
(formerly “SAG,” which is now known as “SAG-AFTRA”), subjects all disputes between those 
parties to mandatory arbitration and, in the case of performers who earn below a certain 
amount, identifies criteria by which to determine when a performer is deemed to be “definitely 
engaged” with a production. These largely follow the mutual-assent requirements of the 
common law of contract except that the Agreement provides that a binding contract is deemed 
to have been made if a producer delivers an unsigned contract to the performer and the 
performer executes it and returns it by the next business day. See PRODUCER-SCREEN ACTORS 
GUILD CODIFIED BASIC AGREEMENT OF 2005, at 243 (2005), available at 
http://www.sagaftra.org/files/sag/2005TheatricalAgreement.pdf. In the case of a document that 
is signed by neither party, it is not clear that this Agreement would apply. With respect to 
performers earning larger amounts, the Basic Agreement is silent on contract-formation 
disputes. 
 86. This assumes that plaintiffs’ success rates with respect to contract-formation issues in 
breach-of-contract litigation involving fully executed agreements are significantly greater than 
28 percent. That seems a reasonable assumption in any well-functioning system of contract law. 
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Table 1. Final Judicial Determinations Concerning the Enforceability 
of “Soft Contracts” in Film and Television Projects (through July 
2014)87 
 
      

















11 8      
Not 
Enforce 
28 13 3 6 13 5 4 
b. Evaluation.  Considered in the aggregate, the data collected on 
litigation activity and outcomes support the view that parties engaged 
in soft-contracting relationships are exposed to some positive, but far 
from certain, risk of contractual or other legal liability. A brief 
overview of the case law in California courts—the leading venue for 
litigation relating to the motion-picture industry—illustrates this 
intermediate view. 
Since at least the late 1940s, California courts have held that the 
typical Hollywood contracting sequence—shake hands, start 
production, and (maybe) work out the details later—may, but will not 
necessarily, result in a legally enforceable agreement. In the 1948 
decision in Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth,88 involving an alleged 
oral agreement between a director and a studio, a California court 
observed that the fact that a “formal written agreement to the same 
effect is to be prepared and signed does not alter the binding validity 
of the oral agreement.”89 This principle sometimes prevails. In the 
most well-known “unsigned deal” litigation, Main Line Pictures, Inc. 
v. Basinger,90 a jury found that Kim Basinger (then considered to be 
star talent) had entered into a binding personal-services contract with 
an independent studio to appear in the film Boxing Helena.91 The 
 
 87. Note that there may be more than one ground for nonenforcement in some cases. 
Hence, the number of cases under “Grounds for Nonenforcement” exceeds the total number of 
“Not Enforce” cases. 
 88. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, 87 Cal. App. 2d 620 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948). 
 89. Id. at 629. 
 90. Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 22, 1994). 
 91. Id. at *1–3. 
Grounds for Nonenforcement 
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commitment was based on oral conversations, an unsigned deal 
memo, and five drafts of a long-form agreement.92 
Notwithstanding the Basinger decision, it is still true that an oral 
or written agreement that is unexecuted or exhibits a low degree of 
specificity does not supply a strong basis for contract enforcement. 
That assertion is supported by the case-law survey described above: in 
more than 70 percent of the identified cases, courts declined to 
enforce underformalized or unexecuted agreements. The best-known 
recent example is the 1998 litigation Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc.93 
between the famous director Francis Ford Coppola and major studio 
Warner Bros., over a proposed film based on the Pinocchio story. The 
trial court declined to find that Coppola was contractually barred 
from producing or directing a film based on the Pinocchio story for 
another studio, in part because the parties had never finalized certain 
elements of their production-services and directing-services 
agreements.94 
As the divergent outcomes in the Basinger and Coppola cases 
illustrate, parties that elect to participate in transactions under 
incompletely specified or unexecuted agreements operate in a “no 
man’s land” that is neither fully within nor fully outside contract law. 
In a business where nobody knows whether a film will succeed (and 
most ultimately do not), it is often the case that nobody knows 
whether a particular transaction is being undertaken pursuant to a 
legally and practically enforceable contract. 
III.  AN ECONOMIC ACCOUNT OF HOLLYWOOD CONTRACTING 
Hollywood contracting is often dismissed as the result of sloppy 
lawyering or the recklessness of creative talent. In this Part, I propose 
 
 92. Id. Basinger ultimately prevailed on technical grounds. Id. at *6. The appeals court 
found that the district court had committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury to 
reach separate liability determinations with respect to Basinger and her “loan-out” corporation. 
Id. 
 93. Coppola v. Warner Bros., Inc., No. BC135198 (L.A. Sup. Ct. July 12, 1998). 
 94. Warner Bros.’s argument rested mostly on the fact that Coppola had signed a 
certificate of employment that purported to transfer to Warner Bros. all copyright and other 
intellectual-property interests relating to Coppola’s contribution to the Pinocchio project. The 
court rejected this argument, on grounds that the certificate of employment was “too vague” 
and did not meet the requirements of the Copyright Act’s statute of frauds. See Joseph D. 
Schleimer, Coppola Verdict’s Impact on Studio/Talent Talks, 14 ENTERTAINMENT L. & FIN. 
(1998), http://www.schleimerlaw.com/elf998.htm. 
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an account that identifies the economic rationale behind this 
seemingly imprudent transactional practice. 
A. Existing Explanations 
Existing explanations for Hollywood’s soft-contracting practices 
do not fully account for this phenomenon. These explanations 
include: ignorance or recklessness, timing pressures to commit rapidly 
to a transaction, and reputational constraints.95 Ignorance or 
recklessness is implausible: both studios and talent are represented by 
experienced agents, lawyers, and other advisors who operate in a 
competitive market. Timing explanations are unpersuasive for several 
reasons: sophisticated law firms routinely prepare complex 
agreements for high-stakes transactions in other fields in a matter of 
days; entertainment lawyers draft and negotiate highly specified 
contracts to govern financing and other transactions; entertainment 
lawyers have access to contract templates that often do not require 
considerable modification;96 and there may be considerable time 
between talent’s “commitment” to the project and the start of 
shooting (not to mention the end of shooting). Reputational factors, 
however, exert considerable influence in relationship-based industries 
such as Hollywood. This is the explanation provided for the use of 
legally unenforceable contracts in other settings,97 and it will play an 
important role in the ensuing analysis. But an entirely reputation-
based explanation falsely anticipates that Hollywood would avoid the 
 
 95. See Douglas Kari, Basinger in the Box: Verbal Contracts in the Film Industry, 15 ENT. L. 
REP. 3, 3 (1993) (observing that timing pressures explain why the film industry often does not 
formalize deals); Bogner, supra note 63, at 364–65 (observing that parties sometimes feel that 
negotiating over details of contracts may prevent a project from moving forward); Gary M. 
McLaughlin, Note, Oral Contracts in the Entertainment Industry, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 101, 
126–27 (2001) (noting that handshake deal practices in the entertainment industry are often 
attributed to timing pressures or creative artists’ neglect of legal details, and arguing that 
reputational pressures might account for the practice); Rick Smith, Comment, Here’s Why 
Hollywood Should Kiss the Handshake Deal Goodbye, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 503, 509–10, 
521–24 (2003) (noting that handshake deals are sometimes attributed to timing pressures and 
reputational constraints, but arguing that the practice is best attributed to studios’ bargaining 
power).  
 96. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42. 
 97. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 525–31 (1993) (explaining 
extracontractual agreements in the context of the Maghribi traders of the eleventh century); see 
also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138–43 (1992) (analyzing extracontractual 
agreements in the diamond industry). 
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expense of contractual documentation altogether or, as is common in 
other business settings, incur the small cost of including a disclaimer 
to avoid unnecessary exposure to legal liability. A mixed explanation 
that integrates both legal and reputational sanctions is therefore 
required. 
B. Theory: The Rationality of Soft Contracts 
To appreciate why soft contracting may represent the most 
efficient transactional instrument in some talent–studio transactions, 
it is necessary to review two alternatives: (1) informal contracts 
governed by reputation and (2) formal (hard) contracts governed by 
law. A third alternative, vertical integration, is addressed later. 
1. Informal Contract (Reputation).  A reputation-based 
explanation for unsigned deal practices assumes that talent’s or the 
studio’s commitment is self-enforcing even without contractual 
liability. That requires assuming that no party will ever abandon a 
film project because doing so would curtail talent’s expected profits 
on all future projects or would harm a studio’s ability to recruit talent 
for future productions. Such unqualified optimism would be naïve. 
Hollywood is not usually depicted as a paragon of good-faith 
behavior (if anything, some would say quite the opposite!). The 
Hollywood press regularly reports cases of apparent opportunism: 
studios substitute even star actors during development,98 producers 
delay moving forward with projects but keep actors indefinitely “on 
call,”99 actors withdraw from projects shortly before the 
commencement of shooting, and, in rare cases, studios terminate 
actors and directors even after shooting has commenced.100 
 
 98. In 1995, actor Laurence Fishburne was reportedly dropped from the cast of Die Hard 
With a Vengeance in favor of Samuel L. Jackson, who could be retained at a lower fee. 
Fishburne sued for breach of contract, despite the absence of a formal agreement. See Bogner, 
supra note 63, at 365 n.47. For a review of similar incidents involving Robin Williams, John 
Cusack, and other stars, see Ben Child, Robin Williams Unamused by Pay Dispute, THE 
GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/film/2008/oct/20/1. 
 99. This type of action prompted a lawsuit by star actress Sharon Stone against producers 
in connection with Basic Instinct 2. Due to allegedly missed opportunities attributable to delays 
in production, she claimed $100 million in damages. Basic Instinct 2 (2006): Trivia, INTERNET 
MOVIE DATABASE (IMDB) (Mar. 18, 2012), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0430912/trivia. The 
suit was settled out of court. Id. 
 100. Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. This type of action precipitated litigation by 
star actress Raquel Welch against MGM for wrongful termination from Cannery Row, 
ultimately resulting in a $10 million damages award against the studio for damage to the 
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This mixed record of compliance with stated commitments may 
reflect the fact that Hollywood exhibits some, but not all, of the 
characteristics of the close-knit environments in which reputation-
based transacting has been most convincingly documented.101 
Hollywood is at best a relatively small world populated by firms and 
individuals that do business with each other repeatedly: six major 
studios, three major talent agencies, a handful of mini–major studios, 
a larger number of independent production companies, a small group 
of high-value talent, and a much larger group of lower-value talent 
consisting of tens of thousands of actors. 
Moreover, membership in these constituencies can be unstable. 
Although studios and talent agencies have long lives, independent 
production companies, individual producers, and talent often have 
short careers.102 Hence, no transacting party can safely assume that 
any given counterparty is a repeat player that values the long-term 
accumulation of reputational capital. Even repeat players may 
rationally deplete reputational capital to avoid an extremely large 
one-time loss or to capture an exceptionally large one-time gain. 
Because an exceptional hit is an infrequent occurrence, the 
temptation to abandon a losing project for an exceptionally promising 
opportunity may outweigh long-term reputational considerations. At 
best, reputation supplies studios and stars with a partial governance 
solution. 
2. Formal (Hard) Contract.  The ability of a contract to actually 
bind parties is always limited by ex ante specification costs and ex 
post enforcement costs. Both costs are high in talent–studio 
transactions. 
a. Specification Costs.  It is difficult for the parties to a contract to 
specify in verifiable language both the contingencies under which 
talent or the studio may “walk away,” consistent with the parties’ 
agreed-upon understanding, and any fee or other penalty that must 
be paid by the terminating party if it exercises the walkaway right. 
Even a simple termination clause that provides a walkaway right 
under certain circumstances subject to a breakup fee is prone to 
forecasting errors. The fee may be set too high or too low, resulting in 
 
actress’s reputation. See Welch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Film Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 101. See supra note 100.  
 102. See LITWAK, supra note 66, at 228–29. 
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a contract that is excessively rigid or flexible relative to the efficient 
contract design that would be negotiated under conditions of perfect 
information and zero transaction costs. In a reputation-rich 
environment, specifying a termination fee ex ante may introduce 
excessive rigidity into the size of the settlement payout, thereby 
impeding parties’ ability to expeditiously reach a reasonable 
resolution following industry norms in any ex post termination 
scenario.103 These inherent constraints mean that even a fully 
enforceable contract will not necessarily provide the parties with an 
efficient governance structure for the proposed transaction. 
b. Enforcement Costs.  The practical ability to enforce any 
agreement is limited for several reasons. It can be difficult to show 
breach of a performance obligation. In the film and television 
industries, actors who are dissatisfied with existing terms have been 
known to feign illness or “phone in” a performance—that is, 
underperform on set—until a resolution is reached.104 Even assuming 
that a breach can be shown, the plaintiff-studio still faces numerous 
obstacles: given the uncertainty of film projects, it may be difficult to 
demonstrate expectation damages; the studio cannot obtain a remedy 
of specific performance to compel talent to perform an employment 
contract;105 and under California law, the studio can obtain a negative 
injunction to bar talent from working for another production during 
the contract term only if the actor’s services are deemed to be of a 
“unique” character.106 To be sure, the threat of contractual liability for 
breach at least poses an in terrorem effect that may exert some 
deterrent force, in part due to the significant cost of defending against 
a legal claim. This threat, however, is far from a perfect enforcement 
mechanism. 
 
 103. As will be discussed, contracts between talent and studios often adopt a bifurcated 
specification strategy with respect to termination. Although the agreement effectively specifies a 
liquidated-damages amount, as discounted by the likelihood of nonenforceability, payable by 
the studio in the event the studio does not use talent’s services (the pay-or-play clause), no such 
fee is specified in the case of termination or nonperformance by talent. Therefore, terminating 
or nonperforming talent are exposed to potential expectation damages and negative injunctive 
relief, again as discounted by the likelihood of nonenforceability. See infra Part IV.C.2.b. 
 104. Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; Interview with Studio 
Exec., supra note 42. 
 105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3423 (West 2014). 
 106. Id.  
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3. The Unconventional Solution: Soft Contracts.  Soft contracting 
provides an intermediate governance mechanism that sometimes 
secures a higher expected value, net of transaction costs, relative to 
either a highly formalized and fully enforceable hard contract, which 
would rely entirely or mostly on legal action to secure parties’ 
commitments, or an unformalized and certainly unenforceable 
informal contract, which would impose few transaction costs but rely 
entirely on reputational forces to secure compliance. 
a. Contractual Formality as Risk Management.  Contract scholars, 
as well as contract-law jurisprudence, neatly divide promissory 
communications into those that are enforceable in contract and those 
that are not. However, contractual enforceability is more precisely 
viewed in continuous terms as a probabilistic outcome, the likelihood 
of which is a positive function of contractual formality.107 Formally, 
this can be rendered as follows: E = f(F), where E denotes the 
likelihood of being held enforceable in court (0 ≤ E ≤ 1), and F 
denotes the level of formalization (0 ≤ F ≤ 1). As depicted in Figure 4 
below, transacting parties select the value of F (and therefore E) by 
investing more or less effort in formalization.108 Retaining a Wall 
Street law firm to draft and negotiate a detailed acquisition 
agreement requires hundreds of expensive attorney-hours, easily 
translating into tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal 
fees, but securing for the client an instrument with a high level of 
enforceability. In contrast, scribbling on a napkin in a Beverly Hills 
restaurant is virtually costless, but results in a low to moderate level 
of enforceability. 
 
 107. Enforceability also requires the exchange of “consideration.” This is not much of a 
requirement: minimal values, or even recitals of consideration, are usually considered sufficient 
to satisfy this requirement. For extensive discussion, see 1464-Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 
101, 105–10 (Tex. 2004).  
 108. Note that the shape of the curve in Figure 4 has been drawn to reflect the reasonable 
assumption that, beyond a certain initial stage, additional investments in formalization yield 
sharply diminishing marginal returns in the form of increased likelihood of contractual 
enforceability. In any given jurisdiction, the relevant curve’s shape will vary, as incremental 
formalization may translate into incremental enforceability at a different rate, depending on 
relevant case law and any individual court’s actual behavior.  
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Figure 4. Formalization and Enforceability 
 
 
Suppose that x represents the level of formalization at which 
there is complete certainty that a court will enforce the contract (that 
is, E = 1), and at any point below x, there is complete certainty that a 
court will not enforce the contract (that is, E = 0). If this were the case 
(as is conventionally assumed), then formalization effort would follow 
the step function depicted by the dashed line in Figure 4 above: where 
F < x, all formalization efforts are wasted, since the increased 
likelihood of enforcement is zero; where F > x, all further 
formalization efforts are wasted, since there are no marginal gains in 
the likelihood of enforcement. But this binary construction does not 
track contracting practices in business environments like Hollywood, 
where parties regularly select low to moderate values of F. The 
continuous function shown above reflects these practices. Provided 
there is some positive likelihood that courts will enforce contracts 
where F < x (a reasonable assumption under current contract law), 
transacting parties will rationally select values well below x—for 
example, F = x*, as shown above—if the cost of any incremental 
formalization would exceed incremental benefit in the form of 
increased enforceability. In any particular transaction, parties may 
elect to invest greater resources and enter into a “high-F” 
commitment (denoted by x) having a high degree of legal 
enforceability, or invest fewer resources and enter into a “low-F” 
commitment (denoted by x*) having a low degree of legal 
enforceability. 
This marginalist approach toward the enforceability of a contract 
can be viewed as a logical extension of the well-established 
marginalist approach taken among law-and-economics scholars 
F 
 E 
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toward the enforceability of any particular contractual term. This 
approach assumes that parties rationally underinvest in specification 
efforts with respect to any particular term in order to economize on 
the expected sum of specification costs ex ante plus dispute-resolution 
costs ex post.109 This nicely explains why even the most sophisticated 
contracts are inherently incomplete. By extension, we can anticipate 
that parties may sometimes elect to underinvest in formalization efforts 
with respect to an agreement taken as a whole. Specifically, parties will 
do so in order to endanger contract formation and thereby generate 
an implicit termination option that cannot be drafted more explicitly 
at a net positive return, taking into account the costs required to 
achieve a higher degree of formalization. The following examines this 
scenario in more detail. 
Exercise of this implicit termination option is achieved by 
withdrawing or announcing withdrawal from the project. Upon 
withdrawal, the exercising party expects to pay an exercise price as 
follows: p = d + l, where d denotes the expected damages award or 
settlement payment in lieu of damages, and l denotes the expected 
litigation and other dispute-resolution costs. The value of d is a 
function of the expectation damages that would be awarded by a 
court in the event of breach, as discounted by the likelihood that the 
court would determine that the parties had entered into an 
enforceable contract.110 By setting the likelihood of enforceability, the 
level of formalization operates as a “meta-term” that calibrates the 
price of exercising the termination option. Everything else being 
equal, low-F contracts result in lower expected damages and, as a 
result, lower settlement payouts, while high-F contracts have the 
opposite effect. The rationale is as follows. At high levels of 
formalization, nonbreaching parties can expect to incur lower costs in 
demonstrating contract formation and pose a more credible litigation 
threat, which means that, holding constant all substantive terms, 
breaching parties expect to pay higher amounts in order to avoid or 
halt litigation with a settlement payout. Conversely, at low levels of 
formalization, nonbreaching parties can expect to incur higher costs 
in demonstrating contract formation and pose a less-credible 
litigation threat, which means that, again holding constant all 
 
 109. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1581, 1610 (2005). 
 110. I ignore for now the reputational cost of exercising the implicit termination right. Later, 
I integrate reputation effects into the analysis.  
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substantive terms, breaching parties expect to pay lower amounts in 
order to avoid or halt litigation with a settlement payout. 
To illustrate, suppose an actor has made a low-F commitment to 
appear in a particular film: that is, he has entered into an uncertainly 
enforceable commitment that implies a positive but discounted 
penalty in case of termination.111 The absence of an entirely reliable 
legal instrument to secure that commitment provides the actor with 
an implicit termination right that will be exercised whenever the actor 
believes that gm > p, where gm denotes the actor’s expected marginal 
net gains on an alternative project.112 At the same time, the presence 
of even an insecure legal instrument generates positive values for d 
and l, which together constitute the expected exercise price, p, that 
induces talent to perform within a certain range of circumstances in 
which he anticipates marginal net gains by moving to an alternative 
opportunity (that is, where gm > 0 but gm < p). 
113 As reflected in 
Figure 5 below, talent will rationally perform, irrespective of any net 
positive outside opportunity, just up to p—that is, the point at which 
 
 111. For convenience, the following discussion analyzes the decision whether to perform or 
breach from the talent’s perspective. The same framework could be applied from the studio’s 
perspective. In practice, contracts between studio and talent—assuming legal enforceability—
typically specify a liquidated-damages amount payable by the studio in the event that it does not 
employ talent’s services (the pay-or-play clause), but contain no such clause in the case of 
termination or other nonperformance by talent, which therefore exposes talent to a 
combination of expected damages and negative injunctive relief. As discussed later, the 
enforceability of the pay-or-play clause is often in doubt due to certain contractual ambiguities. 
See infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text. Hence, even assuming perfect enforceability of 
the underlying agreement, the studio’s legal exposure upon terminating an actor may be 
imprecisely defined. 
 112. More formally, gm = g2 – g1, where g1 equals the expected net gains on the existing 
project, and g2 equals the expected net gains on an alternative project. Note that, for talent, 
gains and losses are not solely defined by short-term monetary outcomes. Participation in a 
“hit” can result in reputational gains that translate into higher compensation on future projects; 
the opposite outcome can result from participation in a “flop.” 
 113. Of course, parties could replicate the incentive structure of a soft contract by entering 
into a fully formalized contract and inserting an appropriate termination fee or other liquidated-
damages clause that enables one or both parties to withdraw whenever the costs of performance 
exceed a certain threshold. Soft contracts will therefore only provide a more-efficient 
alternative to a hard contract in circumstances where the former both imposes a lower 
specification-cost and negotiation-cost burden and secures approximately the same expected 
outcome that would result under a hard contract. As discussed later, these assumptions are most 
likely to be satisfied in repeat-play environments that enable parties to economize on 
formalization expenditures by relying in part on reputational sanctions to regulate counterparty 
opportunism. 
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the marginal net gains from an outside opportunity equal the penalty 
for exercising the implicit termination option.114 
From the talent’s perspective, we can anticipate three outcomes 
under a soft contract, as shown in Figure 5: 
  1. Voluntary performance (gm < 0): Talent anticipates a net 
marginal gain under the contract and performs irrespective of any 
expected legal penalty. 
  2. Involuntary performance (0 < gm < gm*): Talent anticipates a net 
marginal loss under the contract but performs due to the expected 
damages payment and legal costs that would be incurred upon 
termination. 
  3. Termination (0 < gm > gm*): Talent anticipates a net marginal 
loss under the contract and terminates to capture incremental gains 
on an outside opportunity, even after taking into account the 
expected damages payment and legal costs that would be incurred 
upon termination. 
Taken together, these three possible outcomes mean that talent 
effectively commits to perform except in the case of sufficiently high-
value outside opportunities (that is, cases where 0 < gm > gm*). If these 
high-value outside opportunities arise, talent will either withhold 
performance, incur dispute-resolution costs, pay a settlement amount 
to the studio, and then capture the gains on the outside opportunity;115 
or continue performance and receive a continuation payoff that 
accounts for the forfeited marginal gains on the outside opportunity 
less the savings in avoided dispute-resolution costs and damages 
payments. The studio will deliver the continuation payoff so long as it 
is less than the expected cost the studio will incur in locating a 
substitute for the star or canceling the project plus the expected 
amount recoverable from the star in the event of litigation, net of 
legal fees. Whether talent elects termination or renegotiation, he is 
put in the same position and enjoys a net gain equal to gm – p. 
 
 114. Note that Figure 5 holds constant the exercise price, p, but varies gm, the party’s 
expected marginal net gains on an alternative opportunity.  
 115. Note that, in practice, the talent’s new employer will sometimes pay the settlement 
amount by “buying out” the talent’s contract. 
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Figure 5. Possible Outcomes Under a Soft Contract 
 
b. Reputational Constraints.  While soft contracting saves on 
transaction costs relative to hard contracting, it does not supply a 
workable governance instrument in the absence of reputational 
penalties and common knowledge of market norms. Without a clear 
documentary point of reference enforceable by a court or some other 
adjudicative agent, participants must share, and usually conform to, a 
common understanding of the conditions under which it is 
“reasonable” and “unreasonable” to breach.116 Otherwise soft-
contracting environments are liable to suffer from deviations from the 
parties’ implicitly agreed-upon set of termination-and-renegotiation 
options. These deviations can run in both directions. Nonperforming 
parties may terminate unreasonably, resulting in “overtermination” 
relative to the set of circumstances in which the parties had implicitly 
agreed to perform. Or performing parties may litigate against 
reasonably terminating parties, resulting in “undertermination” 
relative to the set of circumstances in which the parties had implicitly 
agreed not to perform. Anticipating those outcomes, parties would 
rationally revert to hard-contracting instruments in order to 
implement their agreement, even taking into account the transaction 
costs required to achieve higher degrees of formalization. 
Overtermination: In the absence of a certainly enforceable 
agreement, opportunistic, uninformed, or misinformed parties can 
misuse the termination option embedded in a soft contract by 
withdrawing in a manner inconsistent with the parties’ implicitly 
 
 116. For a similar view, see W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract 
Enforcement, 65 J. ECON. LIT. 595, 595–628 (2007) (“For a given transaction, there will be a 
number of ways that parties can define breach.”). 
0 + – 
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agreed-upon risk allocation. This would be equivalent to talent 
withdrawing from the project in cases not involving sufficiently high-
value outside opportunities (that is, a case where gm < gm*). The result 
is an excessively flexible contract that overexposes the studio to 
holdup risk ex post—or more precisely, exposes the studio to a level 
of holdup risk that was not reflected in the deal terms—and, by 
anticipation, would compel parties to incur additional specification 
costs ex ante or forego the transaction altogether. Reputational 
liability increases the exercise price due upon termination and 
thereby protects against downward shifts in the threshold point—that 
is, the threshold value of opportunity costs from continued 
participation—at which talent rationally terminates, or credibly seeks 
to renegotiate, further participation in the project.117 
This can be illustrated by the following example. After the studio 
has commenced shooting, any high-value talent in a lead role should 
rationally hold up the studio for additional compensation in an 
amount approaching the studio’s entire expected profit on the film. In 
practice, nothing close to this extreme form of holdup behavior 
actually occurs: even in the absence of a signed deal, talent attorneys 
report that they renegotiate open terms following production but 
refrain from renegotiating the fixed compensation.118 This social 
restraint on transactional opportunism limits the studio’s expected 
exposure to holdup by talent and enables the parties to enter into the 
project at a low level of formalization and with a large savings in 
transaction costs. 
Undertermination: A soft contract implies both the absence of a 
certainly enforceable agreement and the presence of an uncertainly 
enforceable agreement. Given the latter effect, nonterminating 
parties can contest a “reasonable” exercise of the termination option 
through legal action or resist “reasonable” settlements to preempt or 
resolve any such legal action, even if the option is exercised in a 
manner that is consistent with the implicitly agreed-upon risk 
allocation. This would be equivalent to the terminating party being 
forced to incur dispute-resolution costs and make damages payments 
that discourage it from withdrawing from the project in cases 
 
 117. Formally, this requires a revision to the earlier formalization of a party’s breach–
compliance calculation. A party will now rationally perform whenever gm > p, where p = d + l + 
r. Variables d and l are defined as above, and r is defined as the reputational cost associated 
with any observed breach. 
 118. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney II, supra note 52; Telephone Interview 
with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42. 
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involving sufficiently high-value outside opportunities (that is, a case 
where gm ≥ gm*). The result is an excessively rigid contract, which, by 
anticipation, would compel parties to incur greater specification costs 
ex ante or forego the transaction altogether. Reputational penalties 
against non-terminating parties inflate the cost of using legal action 
“aggressively” to contest exercise of the termination option, or to 
reject “reasonable” settlement terms, including continuation terms, 
offered by the terminating party (or, when talent breaches, the 
terminating party’s new employer). Those reputational penalties 
protect against upward shifts in the threshold point—that is, the 
threshold level of opportunity costs from continued performance—at 
which a party may terminate involvement, subject to making an 
appropriate payment to the nonterminating party. 
Reputational pressures explain why studios usually do not bring 
legal action against a high-value actor who terminates his 
participation in a film project, electing instead to expeditiously 
resolve the matter by mutual agreement and put an end to any actual 
or threatened litigation.119 The most well-known unsigned-deal 
litigation, the Basinger case discussed above,120 supplies the exception 
that proves the rule. Hollywood was surprised by both the production 
company’s initial victory in this litigation as well as the fact that the 
production company brought suit at all. As one commentator has 
suggested, the unusually aggressive response to Basinger’s withdrawal 
from the film may have been initiated because the counterparty was a 
small production company experiencing financial difficulties.121 That 
corresponds to an “end-game” scenario whereby a party loses its 
rational incentive to preserve long-term reputational gains by 
conforming to a social norm that discourages initiating litigation in 
response to termination. 
IV.  APPLICATION: EXPLAINING FORMALIZATION CHOICES 
Viewing contract formality as a deal term that serves as a proxy 
for legal enforceability, which in turn sets forth the parameters of a 
termination-and-renegotiation option, provides the basis for 
accounting for observed differences in contract formalization. Field 
interviews and trade-press coverage indicate that parties’ 
 
 119. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. 
 120. See supra Part II.D.2.b. 
 121. See Kari, supra note 95, at 4–5. For the litigation, see Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. 
Basinger, No. B077509, 1994 WL 814244 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1994). 
BARNETT IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2014  10:34 PM 
2015] HOLLYWOOD DEALS 643 
formalization preferences differ not only across transactions but also 
with respect to different parties, elements, and stages of a transaction. 
As reflected in Figure 6 below, parties’ formalization preferences are 
influenced by (1) the specification-cost and enforcement-cost 
expenditures required to replicate that same flexibility at a higher 
level of formality; (2) the holdup risk to which a party is exposed as it 
makes specific investments in the project; and (3) reputational 
constraints and transactional knowledge—that is, familiarity with 
industry norms—that limit parties’ exposure to holdup risk even at 
reduced formalization levels. Hard (high-F) contracts are most likely 
to be used when specification costs and enforcement costs are 
sufficiently low, holdup risk is sufficiently high, and counterparties 
possess insufficient reputational capital and transactional knowledge 
to credibly pledge against opportunism. Soft (low-F) contracts are 
most likely to be used when these values are inverted: when 
enforcement costs and specification costs are sufficiently high, holdup 
risk is sufficiently low, and parties hold sufficient stocks of 
reputational capital and transactional knowledge to credibly pledge 
against opportunism. Informal (zero-F) instruments are used when 
these values are extremely inverted. 
Figure 6. Factors that Influence Formalization Preferences 
 
The result of this process of continuous adaptation is a document 
package consisting of multiple deal elements memorialized at 
different levels of formalization. Contrary to popular impressions, this 
apparently sloppy approach to contractual documentation is neither 
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reckless nor unintended. Rather, it reflects a calculated tradeoff—
with respect to each deal element, deal stage, and deal participant—
that weighs the marginal transactional flexibility and cost savings 
from reduced formalization against the marginal increased risk of 
holdup and other forms of counterparty opportunism. 
A. Transaction Timeline 
Over the course of a talent–studio transaction, there are three 
distinct stages at which either party could fail to conform to some, or 
all, elements of its commitment: 
 Stage I: At any time before shooting, talent or the studio may 
terminate its involvement in the project (or the studio may proceed 
with the project but terminate talent’s involvement). Withdrawal by 
studio or talent prior to shooting is the fact pattern at issue in most of 
the contract-formation cases identified through the case-law and 
trade-press survey.122 A variant of this fact pattern arises in the case of 
sequels, when stars threaten to withdraw pending resolution of an 
increase to the star’s compensation.123  Fear of this type of holdup 
scenario may explain why the studio that backed the Lord of the 
Rings trilogy undertook the enormous expense of shooting the entire 
trilogy at the same time.124 By doing so, the studio eliminated its 
exposure to holdup risk in the event that either of the first two films 
in the anticipated series achieved commercial success. 
 Stage II: Once shooting has started, a party may terminate its 
involvement in the project. There are few reported cases of this type 
 
 122. See Apps. A, B. 
 123. This type of behavior gave rise to a suit between Universal Pictures and Michael 
Oliver, a ten-year-old actor in the Problem Child movie series. Oliver’s guardian renegotiated 
his salary before the shooting of the sequel, Problem Child II. Universal later refused to pay the 
additional amount on the ground that it had agreed to the increased compensation under 
duress, given its investment in production and other expenses. See Diana Haithman, Problem 
Child Part III – The Courtroom, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1992, available at PROQUEST (“In its 
complaint, Universal states that Oliver and Ponce forced Universal to renegotiate under 
‘economic duress.’”). A jury agreed, and the originally negotiated amount was reinstated. Id. 
 124. See Associated Press, ‘Hobbit’ Trilogy Cost $561M So Far, VARIETY, Oct. 4, 2013, 
http://variety.com/2013/film/news/hobbit-trilogy-has-cost-561-million-so-far-1200694351 (“The 
trilogy also appears to be one of the most expensive movie productions in which two or more 
movies are shot at the same time.”). I am grateful to Victor Goldberg for bringing this point to 
my attention. The same “film it all at once” strategy was used in the Pirates of the Caribbean 
sequels: Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s End and Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s 
Chest.  
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of behavior in film projects, most likely due to the severe reputational 
sanctions that a party would suffer by terminating at this point.125 
 Stage III: After theatrical release, the studio may fail to 
distribute box-office revenues as had been promised to talent, or 
talent may claim to be owed “back-end” compensation—that is, a 
contractually agreed-upon portion of the film’s net profits after the 
studio has recouped its costs—based on a position that is inconsistent 
with the parties’ understanding. This type of behavior, typically 
resulting in complaints by talent against a studio, appears to be 
common, even in the case of hard contracts, and is usually resolved 
through a formalized “participation audit.”126 
Figure 7. Transaction Timeline (Talent–Studio) 
 
 
 125. I am aware of two such cases. The studio that made Back to the Future terminated the 
original lead (Eric Stoltz) for the movie after four weeks of shooting and then hired Michael J. 
Fox to play the lead role. This change, and associated reshooting, added $3 million to the 
movie’s budget. See Back to the Future Trivia, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE (IMDB), http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0088763/trivia (last visited Nov. 18, 2014) (“[R]eshooting Stolz’s scenes 
added $3 million to the budget.”). In another case, a studio terminated then-star Raquel Welch 
from a film, which resulted in litigation. For further details, see supra note 100. One interviewee 
reported that, in rare cases, studios have terminated directors and actors shortly after shooting 
has commenced if their performance is unsatisfactory. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra 
note 42. 
 126. For a description of recent disputes in this area, see Bryan M. Sullivan, Audit Trend 
Puts Movie Studios Up in Lights, LAW360 (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/405212. 
These disputes typically arise due to the complex definitions and formulas used to identify and 
calculate the costs that a studio must recoup before its contractual commitment to provide 
talent with a portion of the remaining net profits is triggered. Obviously, the studio makes every 
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B. Formalization Differences by Counterparty 
Interviewee reports and trade commentary reveal a basic pattern 
in Hollywood’s choice of soft- and hard-contracting instruments as a 
function of the type of counterparty involved. In the case of 
transactions involving lower-value talent, outside financing, and 
suppliers of other noncreative inputs, Hollywood tends to prefer hard 
contracts.127 In the case of transactions involving higher-value talent, 
Hollywood sometimes prefers soft contracts.128 This basic difference 
can be accounted for by simple differences in reputational capital and 
transactional knowledge. In the former case, the counterparty is likely 
to be lacking in both respects: as talent, it may be a newcomer to the 
industry; as an outside investor, it may be a one-shot player who 
misconstrues the implicit termination-and-renegotiation option 
embedded in a soft contract. In the latter case, both the star and the 
studio are parties that have (or are represented by an intermediary 
that has) observable reputational stock and transactional knowledge, 
which limits the anticipated level of opportunism risk. As a result, 
parties are rationally willing to make investments in a relationship 
under lower levels of formalization.129 
 
 127. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42; Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra 
note 41.  
 128. See Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 41; Interview with Entm’t Attorney 
III, supra note 41; Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 44; Telephone Interview with 
Studio Counsel III, supra note 44; Interview with Mini–Major Studio Counsel, supra note 48. 
Major studios appear to differ in their perceived willingness to proceed on an “unsigned” basis 
with stars and other higher-value talent. Based on interviews with a selected set of industry 
participants, it appears that one of the six major studios has a reputation for historically 
requiring execution of a long-form agreement as a precondition for commencing shooting. 
Another of the major studios has a reputation for historically being more relaxed in allowing 
production to move forward without a signed long-form agreement, while views were mixed or 
unclear as to the historical or current policies at other studios. See Telephone Interview with 
Studio Counsel I, supra note 49; Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45; Telephone 
Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 44; Interview with Mini–Major Studio Counsel, 
supra note 49; Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; Telephone Interview 
with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42. Views with respect to “unsigned deal policies” may 
differ within the same studio, see Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 41, and those 
polices may change over time in response to market conditions, see id.; Telephone Interview 
with Studio Counsel III, supra note 44. 
 129. Some interviewees, trade commentators, and readers attribute unsigned deals between 
stars and studios to the latter’s bargaining leverage. Although this is an intuitive explanation, it 
is difficult to reconcile with fully rational contracting behavior: compelling the studio to operate 
at a low level of formalization would not make the star any better off since the studio would 
presumably adjust other terms to reflect its greater anticipated exposure to holdup risk. It is 
therefore more coherent to say that the studio agrees to low formalization with a star because 
the latter can pledge its reputational capital against future opportunism, thereby limiting the 
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C. Differences by Time and Transaction Element 
Studios’ and stars’ formalization preferences evolve throughout 
the course of a film’s production and differ with respect to different 
elements of a transaction. These changes and differences in 
formalization preferences can be accounted for by reference to the 
factors mentioned above: specification and enforcement costs, holdup 
risk, and reputational constraints and transactional knowledge. 
1. Development.  At this stage, both studio and talent place a 
high value on being able to withdraw in the event that unfavorable 
information is received, and therefore typically agree on reduced 
contractual formality in the form of an oral agreement or unsigned 
deal memo. Both parties are exposed to the risk of positive and 
negative fluctuations in the expected value of the project (or the 
star130), as assessed relative to other opportunities, in which case any 
agreed-upon deal may turn out to be dramatically misvalued. For 
both the studio and the star, a soft contract provides the flexibility to 
respond to new information by terminating, or threatening to 
terminate, involvement at a reduced risk of legal liability. At a 
transaction-cost savings, this is equivalent to writing a fully formalized 
contract with a high degree of flexibility—for example, a broadly 
defined walkaway right and a low breakup fee in an acquisition 
transaction. Even if greater transactional certainty could be achieved 
through a more formalized contract, an unsigned deal may represent 
a rational underinvestment in specification and negotiation costs 
given the fact that most film projects are shelved or abandoned in the 
development stage,131 in which case all investments, legal and 
otherwise, would be forfeited. 
 
studio’s holdup risk at a transaction-cost savings relative to a more formalized contracting 
instrument. This is consistent with one interviewee’s statement that tolerating an unsigned deal 
can benefit a studio by saving on concessions, Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, 
supra note 45, that would be required to reach a signed deal. 
 130. A star’s expected value is dependent on, among other things, past observed 
performance in other productions. During the intervening period between the point at which a 
studio and talent commit to a particular project and the point at which production commences, 
the star’s value may change depending on whether he or she has participated in a hit or a flop.  
 131. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney I, supra note 42; see also RICHARD 
CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 113 (2002) (“A 
Twentieth Century Fox executive stated that the company receives 10,000 screenplays, 
treatments, books, and oral pitches yearly, puts 70 to 100 projects into development, but makes 
only twelve films.”). 
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2. Pre-Production.  At this stage, the studio’s and the star’s 
formalization preferences diverge to a certain extent. The studio now 
makes increased investments in the human and nonhuman assets 
required to execute a film project, and therefore places increased 
value on contractual formality to secure talent’s participation and 
neutralize any exposure to holdup behavior. In the event that the star 
withdraws from the film, the studio may have breached a 
representation made to outside financiers concerning the use of a 
particular star,132 and the financiers may then be able to withdraw 
their commitments or renegotiate financing terms to the studio’s 
disadvantage.133 However, high-value talent often resists the studio’s 
demand for a finalized long-form agreement. Reportedly the talent’s 
attorneys sometimes do so in order to preserve leverage on 
negotiating open deal points.134 Some even explicitly recommend that 
clients seek to avoid liability by asserting that no contract ever existed 
and “being uncooperative” in order to “renegotiate the terms that 
really concern you.”135 In some cases, talent has used the nonexistence 
of a certainly binding contract “to shop the deal” to other interested 
studios, thereby precipitating a bidding contest that enables talent to 
capture more of the project’s expected value and, consequently, 
expropriate part of the studio’s sunk investment in the project.136 
Negotiation between studio and star over the level of contractual 
formality during this critical stage yields a patchwork result in which 
different levels of formalization apply to various terms of the 
transaction. Roughly speaking, the studio’s and star’s representatives 
appear to select increased formalization with respect to any particular 
element at any particular point in time as holdup risk increases and 
specification costs fall, and vice versa. This assumes that both parties 
hold a sufficient level of reputational capital and market knowledge—
without which the parties would be compelled to select hard 
 
 132. See Telephone Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
 134. See Double Trouble Irks Legal Eagles, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Entm’t 
Attorney III, supra note 42; Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42.  
 135. See Dennis Ardi & Meredith Lobel, How to Break a Contract, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 
7, 1986. 
 136. This may describe the fate of Warner Bros. in a dispute with Francis Ford Coppola, 
who used the lack of a fully executed long-form agreement to argue (successfully) that he was 
free to “shop” to other studios a film project (Pinocchio) originally developed in partnership 
with Warner Bros. In that case, Warner Bros. executives testified that they often have great 
difficulty in obtaining written confirmations of oral commitments from talent’s attorneys. See 
Schleimer, supra note 1. 
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contracting as the only viable transactional instrument. The typical 
resulting document package, organized by decreasing degree of 
formalization, is as follows.137 
a. Certificate of Engagement.  At the highest level of 
formalization, studios usually require that talent execute a “certificate 
of engagement,” which assigns to the studio all of talent’s intellectual-
property rights in the film production.138 The certificate of 
engagement protects the studio against the most salient holdup 
threat—for example, a lawsuit for injunctive relief on the eve of a 
movie’s release—at a nominal specification cost. 
b. Deal Memo; Pay-or-Play Clause.  At an intermediate level of 
formalization, the deal memo typically sets forth some or all of the 
following terms: the fixed compensation; the talent’s role; screen 
credit; the start and end dates of filming; in some cases, expenses and 
some perquisites; and, in abbreviated form, the contingent 
compensation based on the film’s revenues.139  The deal memo often 
includes a pay-or-play commitment that obligates the studio to pay 
talent all or part of the fixed compensation even if talent’s services 
are not used, subject to triggering conditions and, in some cases, a 
force majeure clause.140 Even if the deal memo is unsigned, as is a 
 
 137. Note that the document package described below is intended to be representative of 
soft-contracting transactions in general. Individual transactions may not include all the 
document types described below. 
 138. See Interview with Studio Counsel II, supra note 45. 
 139. This list is based on the terms that appeared most commonly in a review of short-form 
agreements disclosed in litigation, publicly available deal-memo templates, interviews with 
entertainment attorneys, and trade commentary. For further discussion, see also KELLY 
CHARLES CRABB, THE MOVIE BUSINESS: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND 
FINANCIAL SECRETS OF GETTING YOUR MOVIE MADE 151–64 (2005) (outlining these common 
terms and some others that may be included in talent–studio agreements).  Interviewees 
differed over whether perquisites were part of the deal memo. 
 140. Those conditions are vital to determining the actual security provided by a pay-or-play 
commitment. Typically used conditions include agreements securing outside financing; the 
absence of a force majeure event; securing other talent on a pay-or-play basis; or, most 
aggressively, a “final approved bonded budget” (that is, the studio’s final approval to commence 
shooting). See MOORE, supra note 39, at 197. Pay-or-play provisions granted to directors are 
often conditioned on approval by the studio of the final screenplay and engagement by the 
studio of the principal cast on a pay-or-play basis. See HOLLYWOOD DEALMAKING: 
NEGOTIATING TALENT AGREEMENTS FOR FILM, TV AND NEW MEDIA 102–03 (Dina Appleton 
& Daniel Yankelevits eds., 2010) (“[T]he director will be deemed pay-or-play when . . . . [t]he 
studio has approved the final screenplay [and] . . . engaged the principal cast on a pay-or-play 
basis.”).  
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common occurrence,141 or the conditions to the pay-or-play 
commitment remain unspecified,142 that commitment is partially 
supported by reputational forces and, in some cases, by an escrow 
mechanism.143 Note that the pay-or-play commitment not only 
protects talent against losses incurred as a result of termination by the 
studio but, as a liquidated-damages clause, also protects the studio by 
capping the damages it owes talent in the event that the studio 
terminates the actor or the project. That protection is only partial, 
however, so long as the underlying instrument remains unsigned, the 
triggering conditions remain unspecified, or the commitment is 
subject to either strict triggering conditions or a broad force majeure 
clause—as is suggested by reported failures to honor pay-or-play 
commitments.144 
c. Draft Long-Form Agreement.  The remaining terms, as set 
forth in drafts of the long-form agreement, are subject to the lowest 
level of formalization and are therefore prone to renegotiation in the 
course of production. These primarily include all the terms set forth 
in the deal memo but now specified in significantly greater detail. 
Such terms include talent’s screen and advertising credit, expenses, 
perquisites, contingent compensation, and the vesting schedule and 
triggering events for the pay-or-play commitment.145 The studio may 
 
 141. See Interview with Studio Exec., supra note 42. 
 142. Id.  
 143. See CRABB, supra note 139, at 219 (“[A]gents in Hollywood are likely to demand that 
the actor’s fee be put in an escrow account and paid out to the actor according to the actor’s 
agreement.”).  
 144. For litigation by stars who claimed that production entities had failed to honor an 
unsigned pay-or-play commitment, see Child, supra note 98 (involving Robin Williams); Basic 
Instinct 2 (2006): Did You Know?, supra note 99 (involving Sharon Stone). SAG maintains an 
“Unfair List” of production companies that cancel projects and then refuse to honor pay-or-play 
commitments to talent. The list had over one hundred entries for the period from September 
2006 through June 2011. The Unfair List, SCREEN ACTORS GUILD (2011), http://www.sag.org/
files/sag/documents/TheUnfairList_as_of_June2011.pdf.  
 145. Nonprice terms that typically appear in an actor’s agreement include approval rights 
concerning use of talent’s name, likeness, and image; creative-approval rights; post-production 
obligations (for example, terms for “retakes”); promotional obligations; a performance-standard 
and morals clause; definitions of default and force majeure events, which negate the pay-or-play 
commitment; auditing and accounting mechanisms relating to the contingent compensation; a 
specification of the governing law; and dispute-resolution mechanisms. A director’s agreement 
includes terms similar to those in actors’ agreements, in addition to the terms specific to the 
director’s role. For useful discussion, see CRABB, supra note 139, at 217–23. For a sample actor’s 
agreement, see Selz, supra note 21, App. A-21. For a sample director’s agreement, see MARK 
LITWAK, DEALMAKING IN THE FILM AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY: FROM NEGOTIATION TO 
FINAL CONTRACTS 135–47 (3d ed. 2009).  
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elect to proceed without a “signed up” deal given the star’s and his or 
her representatives’ observable reputational capital, which reduces 
holdup risk, and the specification costs plus deal concessions,146 which 
would have to be incurred to reach a fully signed-up deal. 
3. Production.  At this stage, the studio and the star have almost 
diametrically opposed formalization preferences. The studio places a 
high value on contractual formality since it has made a large 
irreversible investment in the star and other assets in a production 
predicated on the star’s participation. Even the slightest delay in 
production translates immediately into significant costs and 
endangers completion because the cast has typically committed to 
perform only during a limited period. But high-value talent has little 
reason to enter into a contract at this stage. If, as is typical, the studio 
has made a pay-or-play commitment in existing draft documentation, 
the studio has a limited ability to disclaim that commitment once 
shooting has commenced, at least as a reputational matter. 
Additionally, the absence of executed long-form documentation 
enables the star’s representative to engage in renegotiation of open 
nonprice terms, subject to reputational constraints.147 Executing a 
fully formalized agreement would forfeit renegotiation opportunities 
while delivering little value in the form of protection against 
opportunism by the studio, which has few holdup opportunities given 
the difficulty of substituting comparable talent once shooting has 
commenced. Perhaps for that reason, star actor Charlton Heston 
boasted that he had never started production on a film with a signed 
completed contract.148 That is, Heston always had sufficient 
reputational capital to preserve his renegotiation option and, as a 
difficult-to-replace human capital asset, had little reason to fear being 
held up by the studio. 
V.  WHY NOT VERTICAL INTEGRATION? 
Holdup risk, severe uncertainty, high specification and 
enforcement costs, and positive but limited reputation effects are 
 
 146. See Interview with Studio Counsel III, supra note 45. 
 147. The studio is not always helpless on this front. One interviewee reported that studios 
sometimes hold back a certain percentage of talent’s compensation contingent upon execution 
of a long-form agreement. See Telephone Interview with Entm’t Attorney III, supra note 42.  
 148. See Charlton Heston, Of Trust, Manners and How Hollywood Works, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 12, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-12/entertainment/ca-21971_1_hollywood-
works.  
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hardly unique to the movie industry. These challenging conditions are 
often addressed through a simpler alternative to contract: vertical 
integration that eliminates arm’s-length transactions altogether. That 
well-known solution follows a basic principle of transaction-cost 
economics. When it is too costly to contract to protect against holdup 
risk, one party may acquire the other party and replace contract with 
the managerial fiat that governs relationships within an integrated 
corporate entity—in this case, converting the talent–studio 
relationship from a one-off contracting relationship to a long-term 
employment relationship. Conversely, when it is too costly to 
undertake the relevant activity within an internal firm-based 
structure, parties will transition to arm’s-length contractual structures. 
Following Ronald Coase’s fundamental proposition, observed 
transaction structures reflect the comparative costs of using market-
based rather than firm-based structures.149 
Roughly speaking, Hollywood appears to have migrated from a 
firm-based to a market-based system for coordinating the supply of 
creative and noncreative inputs for purposes of motion-picture 
production. However, closer scrutiny shows that Hollywood’s 
transactional path is more nuanced and does not fully conform to this 
standard sequence. 
From the 1920s through the late 1940s, Hollywood operated 
under a firm-based structure. The studio system secured both the 
studio’s and talent’s commitments to an unspecified series of film 
productions, which then took place within the confines of the 
studio.150 Studios signed talent to multiyear contracts that guaranteed 
the talent fixed compensation during the contract term, akin to an 
extended pay-or-play commitment, subject to the studio’s option to 
terminate or extend the contract at periodic intervals up to a total 
period of seven years per interval.151 Any actor who refused to 
perform in a particular project would be “suspended” and the missed 
time added to the term of the contract.152 The latter clause was 
effectively a pre-agreed negative injunction that mitigated the studio’s 
exposure to holdup by talent that had accumulated (with the studio’s 
 
 149. See Coase, supra note 10. For subsequent articulations of this thesis, see WILLIAMSON, 
supra note 17; Klein, supra note 17. 
 150. For the authoritative account of this period, see generally THOMAS SCHATZ, THE 
GENIUS OF THE SYSTEM: HOLLYWOOD FILMMAKING IN THE STUDIO ERA (2010). 
 151. See Kindem, supra note 22, at 84. 
 152. See SCHATZ, supra note 150, at 84.  
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assistance) valuable reputational capital.153 The transactional security 
of a long-term employment arrangement both protected the studio 
against opportunistic renegotiation by a star—with some 
exceptions154—and, within the term of any option renewal, protected 
talent against opportunistic renegotiation by the studio. 
Starting in the late 1940s, the advent of television reduced the 
volume of films demanded by the market and made it unprofitable 
for the studio to bear the cost of maintaining a standing pool of 
creative and technical personnel.155 The standard sequence anticipated 
by transaction-cost economics anticipates that the industry would 
have then migrated to a governance structure based on market-based 
contractual agreements. This is partially true. Starting in the late 
1940s, Hollywood evolved toward the disaggregated transactional 
structure familiar today: a hub of major studios that engage outside 
talent and production and other entities on a project-specific basis.156 
But these one-shot transactions do not operate subject exclusively to 
the soft-contracting mechanisms typically associated with market-
based relationships. Rather, as this Article has demonstrated in detail, 
Hollywood operates subject to a mix of short-term hard contractual 
agreements, which rely primarily on formal enforcement, and repeat-
play soft contractual agreements, which rely significantly on 
reputational enforcement. 
Hollywood’s historical shifts between firm-based and market-
based relationships can be explained as an efficient response to the 
transactional hazards associated with film production and 
distribution. Historical evidence suggests that the soft contract took 
on greater prominence in Hollywood roughly when the studio system 
entered into decline. The surveys of reported litigation and case law 
described earlier found only one court decision, and one other 
reported dispute, relating to contract formation in connection with a 
film project before 1947—precisely the time at which the studio 
system began to unravel.157 Moreover, those two disputes arose in the 
 
 153. This did not always work. Some of the most famous stars attempted to withdraw from 
their contracts, including James Cagney and Bette Davis. See id. at 138–39, 218–20.  
 154. See supra note 153. 
 155. See MICHAEL HAUPERT, THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 117–18 (2006). 
 156. See Joseph Lampel & Jamal Shamsie, Capabilities in Motion: New Organizational 
Forms and the Reshaping of the Hollywood Movie Industry, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 2189, 2207 
(2003). 
 157. A California state-court case in 1936 involving the famous actor James Cagney 
concerned an oral agreement with respect to the number of films in which Cagney had agreed to 
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early 1920s, at the inception of the studio-system era. Although the 
timing may be merely suggestive, this sequence is consistent with an 
organizational narrative in which informal contracting, and the 
attendant holdup problems, appeared just before the start of the 
studio system, which then sought to resolve those contracting 
difficulties through vertical integration. As the studio system 
unraveled, these same problems reappeared. In response, Hollywood 
appears to have adopted both conventional one-shot contractual 
mechanisms and an unconventional transactional mechanism that lies 
somewhere between the alternatives of firm and market. 
The soft contracts that govern relationships between studios and 
stars (and, less consistently, other segments of the industry) fall 
somewhere between three canonical transactional forms: long-term 
formal contracting, short-term formal contracting, and repeated 
informal contracting governed significantly by reputation effects. 
Exploiting the two vectors of duration and formality, these 
transactional options, and the Hollywood alternative, can be depicted 
as shown below. The old studio system primarily operated in region I: 
long-term formal contracting (interrupted by periodic renegotiations 
at each option renewal for a high-value star). The unraveling of that 
system appears to have pushed transactions between studios and the 
general class of input providers into two transactional alternatives. 
Transactions between a studio on the one side and noncreative input 
providers and lower-value creative input providers on the other side 
tend to operate in region II: short-term formal contracting. 
Transactions between a studio and high-value creative input 
providers, as well as some other parties, tend to operate in region III: 
a boundary zone occupied by the unsigned deal—that is, a 
substantially incomplete contractual instrument supported in part by 
repeat-play reputational constraints, which are reflected by a 
medium-term durational vector. 
 
perform. See Terms of Cagney Deal Taxes Warner Memory, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 5, 1936. This 
dispute—like many other disputes at the time between studios and major stars—did not contest 
the existence of a legally binding agreement between talent and the studio. Rather, such 
disputes concerned the interpretation of specific contractual terms or whether specific terms had 
been breached. Id. 
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Figure 8. A Transactional Typology of Film Production 
 
VI.  BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
I began by treating Hollywood’s predilection for soft contracting 
as an anomalous phenomenon considered from the perspective of 
conventional business-law practice. But the proposed economic 
rationale for soft contracting implies that Hollywood may not be the 
outlier it initially appears to be. Any industry that shares the 
characteristics of the film industry—high holdup risk and outcome 
uncertainty, high specification and enforcement costs, and positive 
but limited reputational effects—should be expected to adopt some 
form of soft-contracting instruments. If that is the case, then soft 
contracting may carry normative implications for contract law in 
general. 
A. Soft Contracts Beyond Hollywood 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, other markets also 
adopt some form of soft-contracting instruments. The use of open-
ended precontractual agreements reportedly characterizes some 
technology-transfer, project-finance, and infrastructure projects, in 
which negotiation is prolonged concurrently with staged 
performance.158 Soft-contracting instruments with uncertain 
enforceability even appear in conventional business environments: 
merchants exchange letters of credit with documentary defects;159 rail-
freight carriers and shippers use informal and legally unenforceable 
 
 158. See LAKE, supra note 36, at 54. 
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contracts to implicitly alter regulatory constraints;160 parent firms 
sometimes issue “comfort letters” or “keepwell agreements” in 
support of the financial obligations of a subsidiary;161 underwriters 
commonly issue “best efforts” commitment letters to an issuer in 
connection with initial public offerings;162 and cable-television 
operators enter into “unsigned but operative” agreements with video-
programming distributors.163 In refusing to enforce an unsigned LLC 
agreement under the applicable statute of frauds, the Delaware 
Chancery Court observed that private-equity funds sometimes use 
oral agreements and “roughly-outlined unsigned arrangements or 
draft agreements” in lieu of definitive LLC agreements.164 These oral 
instruments are apparently so vital that private-equity funds 
successfully lobbied the Delaware legislature to clarify that the statute 
of frauds does not apply to those agreements.165 
B. Why Soft Contracts Matter for Contract Law 
The widespread use of soft-contracting practices implies an 
efficient purpose. Given that soft contracts require a legal regime in 
which courts sometimes enforce underformalized agreements, the 
historical relaxation of formalization thresholds in the common law of 
contract and the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)166 may 
therefore rest on an efficiency rationale. In Hollywood and 
elsewhere, the relaxation of bright-line formalization thresholds 
creates a zone of legal ambiguity in which parties often prefer to 
transact. A legal regime that obfuscates the required level of 
 
 160. See Thomas M. Palay, Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and the 
Role of Informal Agreements, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 155, 164–69 (1985) (highlighting the use of 
informal, legally unenforceable contracts between rail-freight carriers and shippers).  
 161. See Guarantees and Other Forms of Explicit Support, DBRS (Aug. 2010), http://www
.dbrs.com/research/234322/dbrs-criteria-guarantees-and-other-forms-of-explicit-support.pdf 
(distinguishing guarantees from keepwell agreements and comfort letters). 
 162. See LAKE, supra note 36, at 14–15. 
 163. See United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11:1-CV-106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *9 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 1, 2011). 
 164. Delaware Court Rules LLC Operating Agreements are Subject to Statute of Frauds, 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.milbank.com/images/
content/7/9/794/111008_Olson_v_Halvorsen.pdf (citing Olson v. Halversen, No. 1884-VCL, 2008 
WL 4661831 (Del. Ch. Oct. 22, 2008), aff’d 986 A.2d 1150 (Del. 2009)).  
 165. 77 Del. Laws ch. 287 (2010). For discussion, see Milbank, supra note 164. 
 166. Section 1-201(3) of the U.C.C. discards the common law’s traditional narrow definition 
of a legally enforceable contract in favor of a loose definition: “the bargain of the parties . . . as 
found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, 
course of dealing, or usage of trade.” U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2001). 
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formalization expands the universe of transactional opportunities for 
efficient exchange.167 
A brief thought experiment can illustrate this argument. Suppose 
California clarified and increased its formalization threshold. In this 
example, courts would be prohibited from finding any agreement to 
be enforceable absent mutual execution of a notarized agreement 
initialed by both parties on each page of the document with 
representation by a licensed attorney. That requirement eliminates 
virtually all ambiguity over the availability of legal recourse but, for 
the same reason, may distort parties’ efficient choice of contracting 
form, and may even prevent certain transactions altogether. In an 
environment characterized by sufficiently high specification costs and 
sufficiently weak reputation effects, neither formal contract nor 
reputational forces can independently induce participation by talent 
and studio, which therefore bargain toward an intermediate level of 
formalization that implies a limited likelihood of judicial 
enforcement. Under the hypothetical California regime, however, 
studio and talent would be precluded from using a soft-contracting 
instrument, which would have no legal force and would therefore be 
equivalent to entering into an informal agreement secured by nothing 
but reputational pressures. As a result, studio and talent would be 
forced to operate under a higher-than-desired level of formalization, 
which would either require them to incur avoidable transaction costs 
or, depending on the total value at stake, preclude the relevant 
transaction altogether. 
Ambiguous enforceability enables parties to operate in a low-F 
contracting zone that relies on a mix of reputational and legal liability 
to secure parties’ agreed-upon commitments at the lowest 
transaction-cost burden. Upward adjustments in the formality 
requirement would eliminate or curtail that ambiguous zone by 
clarifying that low-F contracts entail zero legal risk. That would 
compel parties to elect one of two inferior options: either high-F 
agreements that are certainly enforceable but necessitate greater 
transaction-cost expenditures to achieve the same expected outcome, 
or agreements at all lower values of F that would now be certainly 
 
 167. Professor Geis makes a related argument with respect to parties’ use of strategic 
ambiguity in the drafting of contracts, which he attributes to parties’ rational gamble on judicial 
interpretation of the relevant terms ex post given their inability to reach agreement on the 
meaning of those terms ex ante. That strategy depends on courts’ willingness to fill in gaps in 
contracts that suffer from indefiniteness rather than deeming such contracts to be invalid. Geis, 
supra note 31, at 1664. 
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unenforceable and that would therefore convert to a zero-F contract 
relying solely on reputational liability to constrain counterparty 
opportunism.168 Given that parties already elect to operate in the low-
F zone, which is characterized by limited expected liability and could 
voluntarily substitute high-F or zero-F instruments, eliminating the 
low-F zone entirely by raising the formality threshold for contract 
enforceability to encompass only high-F contracts would necessarily 
compel parties to adopt less efficient transactional forms. In extreme 
cases, transactions would be entirely blocked: the high-F contracts 
would impose excessive transactional burdens, while the remaining 
option of a zero-F contract would leave parties vulnerable to 
counterparty opportunism.169 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom and standard business-law practice assume 
that sophisticated parties prefer clearly enforceable contracts over 
oral agreements or other informal communications that are 
uncertainly enforceable. Hollywood appears to be an exception: 
there, sophisticated parties in high-stakes transactions regularly select 
intermediate levels of contractual formality that leave the 
enforceability of the parties’ commitments unclear. 
Hollywood dealmakers are neither reckless nor imprudent. 
Legally ambiguous contracts provide the most efficient governance 
mechanism whenever any alternative instrument, ranging from formal 
contract to reputational exchange, cannot independently achieve a 
superior expected outcome net of specification and enforcement 
costs. Hollywood’s finely tailored transactional choices reflect a 
continuous assessment of the marginal value of increased 
formalization efforts in an environment in which holdup risk and 
 
 168. This actually seems to be the case with respect to transactions involving studios and 
writers. As noted previously, interviewees reported that agreements with writers were always 
done on a fully signed-up basis due to the statute of frauds with respect to the transfer of 
copyright interests under the Copyright Act. See supra note 81. The statutory formalization 
requirement therefore truncates a portion of the transactional universe in studio–writer 
relationships. 
 169. This is not intended as a definitive argument in favor of relaxed formalization 
requirements. As is widely argued, reducing the formalization threshold may allow courts to 
protect unsophisticated parties who unwittingly rely on insufficiently formalized commitments 
due to ignorance of the law. But the opposite can also be true: reducing formalization thresholds 
may enable sophisticated parties to exploit unsophisticated parties who unwittingly take on 
contractual liability due to ignorance of the law. The precise balancing of these social costs and 
benefits is inherently indeterminate.  
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outcome uncertainty are high, formal contracting requires significant 
specification and enforcement expenditures, reputation effects are 
salient but unreliable, and vertical integration is no longer 
economically viable. Close analysis shows that Hollywood’s 
predilection for ambiguously enforceable contracts is neither 
anomalous nor irrational. Rather, it illustrates an overlooked 
alternative on the transactional spectrum that extends from formal 
markets of single-shot contracting parties protected by law, to 
informal communities of repeat players constrained by reputation. 
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APPENDIX A 
REPORTED CONTRACT-FORMATION DISPUTES INVOLVING TALENT 
AND STUDIO OR OTHER PRODUCTION ENTITY IN FILM AND 
TELEVISION PROJECTS (THROUGH JULY 2014)170 
Legend: 
T = talent; S = studio (or other production entity or individual producer) 
O = oral; W = written 
U = unknown 
 
Year Parties (T/S) Film or Television Project 









1923 A. Jolson/D.W. Griffith His Darker Self O T Enforced 
1924 D. Collins/Bennett et al. Queen of the Flat Top O S U  
1947 Johnston/20th C. Fox The Clock Struck Twelve O S Enforced 
1948 De Toth/Columbia 
Pictures 
n/a (long-term contract) O T Enforced 
1949 Mason/Rose n/a (series of movies)171 W S Not 
Enforced 
1950 N. Algren/Roberts Prods. 
Inc. 
The Man with the Golden 
Arm 
O T U 
1950 B. Davis/Ramon Romero Mrs. Lincoln O T U 
1952 Werker/M. Briskin, 
Morjay Prods. et al. 
Cry Tough O/W S U 
1952 Unidentified 
Actress/RKO 
Not specified O S U 
1955 Skirball/RKO Appointment in Samarra O S Enforced 
1955 H. Lloyd/California 
Pictures Corp.  
Mad Wednesday O  S Remanded 
1956 B. Donlevy/Carthy Prods. King of Hearts O T U 
1956 S. Hayden/Warner Bros. Tension at Table Rock O S U 
1957 C. Heston/Warner Bros. Darby’s Rangers U S Settled 
1958 K. Briggs/MGM et al. High School Confidential O S U 
1958 Holden/Paramount The Horse Soldiers O T Not 
Enforced 
 
 170.  I gathered all the information presented here through the Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw 
databases, the Daily Variety digital archives, and other trade-press sources. All disputes involve 
the filing of lawsuits except two matters (as indicated) and an arbitration through the Writers 
Guild of America (WGA), which is also indicated. Any dispute for which the outcome is 
indicated as “enforced” or “not enforced” indicates that a court or jury reached a final 
determination, in which case the dispute is included in the list of judicial opinions in App. B. 
Sources for all other items were located through the Daily Variety archives and other trade 
publications, which can be found by the source’s year of publication and party’s name as listed 
in App. C. I restricted my search to contract-formation disputes involving talent (that is, writers, 
directors, and actors) and a studio (including any type of production company or individual 
producer). I excluded talent–studio disputes involving claimed contracts relating to a particular 
term of an agreement but that did not raise any doubt as to talent’s or studio’s commitment to 
perform, and “idea submission” disputes involving allegations by a writer or producer that a 
studio or other production entity misappropriated an idea pitched to the studio or production 
entity. For brevity, I do not always list all parties’ names.  
 171. Joint venture to form a production company. 
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Year Parties (T/S) Film or Television Project 









1959 K. Frings/United Artists 
et al. 
Two for the Seesaw O S U 
1959 Carter/Milestone Operation Mad Ball W S Not 
Enforced 
1960 R. Parrish/Omat Prods. Brotherhood of Evil O S U 
1961 J. Landis/J. Gentile Tragedy in a Small Town O S U172  
1963 B. Breen/Samuel 
Goldwyn Co. 
Porgy & Bess O T Not 
Enforced 
1963 C. Odets/MGM The Actor O S U 
1964 A. Quinn/United Artists The Magnificent Seven O S Not 
Enforced 
1964 Boyd/T. Mann, Benton 
Film Prods. 
The U Battle O S U 
1965 D. Murphy/G. Conway et 
al. 
This Hero Breed O T U 
1968 F. Dunaway/O. 
Preminger 
Hurry Sundown O T Settled 
1968 P. Lawford/Embassy 
Pictures and Paramount 
Something Beginning with M O T U 
1968 E. Taylor, R. Burton/J. 
Blaustein 
The Taming of the Shrew O T Dismissed 
1969 E. Silverstein/Warner 
Bros. 
Nobody Loves a Drunken 
Indian 
O S U 
1971 M. von Sydow, L. 
Ullman/MGM 
Man’s Fate O S U 
1972 J. Palance/S. Peckinpah et 
al. 
The Getaway O T U 
1973 N. Montex/20th C. Fox Che O S Dismissed 
1976 F. Dolan/Columbia 
Pictures  
Ann Carver’s Profession O S U 
1984 M. Steenburgen/MGM Roadshow O S Settled 
1986 F. De Felitta/Polygram Sea Trial O S U 
1987 R. Dangerfield/Warner 
Bros. 
Caddyshack II O S Settled 
1988 B. Lancaster/Columbia 
Pictures 
The Old Gringo O/W  S U 
1989 A. Pacino/E. Kastner, 
Cinema Corp.  
Carlito’s Way O  T U 
1989 B. De Palma, O. 
Litto/Orion Pictures 
Dressed to Kill O  S U 
1989 Pinckney/Valente-Kritzer Callenetics O S Not 
Enforced 
1991 E. Lloyd/Orion Pictures Mermaids O S Settled 
1991 García Márquez/Roth Love in the Time of Cholera W T Not 
Enforced 
1992 J. Mattson/De Laurentiis 
Productions 
Milk Money O T U 
1992 H. King/Inspiration 
Pictures 
Romola O S Settled173 
 
 172. WGA arbitration. 
 173. Settlement is assumed based on the fact that the plaintiff-director who claimed breach 
by the studio directed the film. See Romola (1924)—IMDb, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0015289 (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). 
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Year Parties (T/S) Film or Television Project 









1992 R. Mulcahy/Davis-Panzer 
Prods. 
Highlander III O T U 
1993 Konigsberg/Rice The Mummy O T Not 
Enforced 
1993 K. Basinger/Main Line Boxing Helena O T Enforced 
1993 A. Bening/Samuel 
Goldwyn Co. 
The Playboys O T Settled 
1993 J. Milius/Price 
Entertainment 
Texas Rangers O S U 
1993 W. Goldberg/T Rex Prod. 
Co. 
T. Rex O T Settled 
1995 P. Anderson/Private 
Movie Co. 
Hello, She Lied O T Not 
Enforced 
1997 J. Travolta/Mandalay 
Entertainment 
The Double O  T Settled 
1997 J. Foster/Polygram The Game O  S U 
1997 F. Dunaway/L. Persky Master Class O S Settled 
1998 M. Myers/Universal Dieter O  T Settled 
1998 F.F. Coppola/Warner 
Bros. 
Pinocchio O/W  T Not 
Enforced 
2000 Rappaport/Buske Fabulously Fit and Famous O S Not 
Enforced 
2001 S. Stone/Unnamed Prod. 
Co. 
Basic Instinct 2 O  S Suit With-
drawn 
2002 T. Kaye/Flashwork Prods. Victim of Deceit O T Dismissed 
2002 Lombardo/Mauriello Mother and Child W S Enforced 
2003 Rai/Unidentified Studio The Rising O T U 
2003 D. Lane/Intermedia Films Me Again W S Settled 
2007 B. Pitt/Universal State of Play O  S Settled174 
2007 J. Goodman/Constantin 
Films 
Pope Joan O T Settled 
2008 Hansen/Geisler Desperadoes W S Not 
enforced 
2009 Shade/Gorman American Heroes W S Not 
Enforced 
2010 Fiat Risus (R. 
Williams)/Gold Circle 
Films 
Cop Out (formerly titled A 
Couple of Dicks) 
W T Not 
Enforced 
2012 Fraser/Moyer et al. Not specified W S Pending 
2013 C. Scorsese/Jumpview 
Entertainment 
Campus Life O S Pending 




 174. No lawsuit was filed. The parties resolved their dispute once an acceptable replacement 
for Brad Pitt was found. See Baz Bamigboye, Russell Crowe in Secret Deal to Save Brad Pitt 
from Lawsuit, MAIL ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2009, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1172991/BAZ-BAMIGBOYE-Russell-Crow-
secret-deal-save-Brad-Pitt-lawsuit.html.  
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APPENDIX B 
PUBLISHED OR OTHER REPORTED JUDICIAL DECISIONS INVOLVING 
CONTRACT-FORMATION DISPUTES IN FILM AND TELEVISION 
PROJECTS (THROUGH JULY 2014)175 
Legend: 
O = oral agreement 
W = written agreement (deal memo, letter agreement, unsigned long-form agreement) 
Def. = definite (certainty, agreement on all material terms) 
Indef. = indefinite (uncertainty, lack of agreement on essential terms, vagueness) 
 
Case (Year) Type 
of 
Agmt 
Parties Enf’d? Grounds Governing 
Law176 
 
D.W. Griffith Co. v. Jolson 
(1923) (Jolson, Out of 
Film, Sued for $571,696, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1924, 
at 20) 
O Studio/actor Y Def. New York 
Johnston v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 




Y Def. California 
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. 
De Toth, 197 P.2d 580 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1948) 
O Studio/director 
 
Y Def. California 
Mason v. Rose, 176 F.2d 
486 (2d Cir. 1949) 
W Actor/studio177 
 
N Indef. United 
Kingdom; 
California 
Skirball v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, 286 P.2d 954 (Cal. 




Y Def. California 
Paramount Pictures Corp. 
v. Holden, 166 F. Supp. 684 
(C.D. Cal. 1958) 
O Studio/actor N178 No injunctive 





 175. I identified the cases presented here through the Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases, 
with the following geographic and date limitations: all federal, New York, and California courts 
from start of database coverage through July 31, 2014; and all state courts (except New York 
and California) from January 1, 1980, through July 31, 2014. As noted above, some opinions 
appear in the electronic database but are unpublished. Various search terms were used for 
purposes of identifying fully litigated cases that primarily involved a film or television 
production and addressed the enforceability of an oral or written agreement—excluding cases 
that addressed only the enforceability of a particular term in an otherwise-enforceable oral or 
written agreement and cases that involved idea submission scenarios. As indicated above, two 
cases were identified solely through trade-press sources. See App. C. for full citation 
information. 
 176. Governing law refers to state law as selected in a claimed written contract; state law as 
designated by the court in the case of a claimed oral contract or claimed written contract that 
did not specify governing law; and federal law in the case of a claimed violation of § 204(a) of 
the Copyright Act (its statute-of-frauds provision). 
 177. Joint venture to form production company. 
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Case (Year) Type 
of 
Agmt 
Parties Enf’d? Grounds Governing 
Law176 
 
Carter v. Milestone, 338 




N Indef. California 
Breen v. Samuel Goldwyn 
Co. (1963) (Los Angeles 
Superior Court) (Daily 
Variety  1963) 
O Director/ 
producer 
N Not stated California 
Anthony Quinn v. United 
Artists, et al. (Los Angeles 
Superior Court, 1964) 
(Daily Variety 1964) 
O Actor/studio N Not stated California 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
Inc. v. Scheider, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 205 (App. Div. 
1974) 




Sawyer v. Sickinger, 366 




N Statute of frauds New York 
Jillcy Film Enters., Inc. v. 
Home Box Office, Inc., 593 




N Statute of frauds; 
indef. 
New York 
Winston v. Mediafare 
Entm’t Corp., 777 F.2d 78 
(2d Cir. 1985) 
W/O Agent/ 
producer  
N No intent to be 
bound 
New York 
Valente-Kritzer Video v. 








Effects Ass’ns, Inc. v. 









Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 




N Indef.; agreement 
to agree 
California 
Geoquest Prods., Ltd. v. 
Embassy Home Entm’t, 





N Def. Illinois 
Konigsberg Int’l, Inc. v. 





N Copyright statute 
of frauds 
Federal 
Main Line Pictures, Inc. v. 
Basinger, 1994 WL 814244 
(Cal. App. 1994)  
W/O Studio/actor Y Def. California 
Trimark Pictures, Inc. v. 
August Entm’t, Inc., No. 




N Statute of frauds Federal 
 
 178. The court declined to rule on the existence of a binding contract (the determination of 
which was remanded to the lower court), but also declined to issue an injunction against the 
actor’s working for another employer during the contract term due to the absence of a written 
agreement. I therefore treat this outcome as the functional equivalent of the court’s having 
declined to enforce the claimed contract. 
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Case (Year) Type 
of 
Agmt 
Parties Enf’d? Grounds Governing 
Law176 
 
The Private Movie Co., Inc. 
v. Pamela Anderson, No. 
BC 136805 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 1995) 
 
O Studio/actor N Indef. California 
Coppola et al. v. Warner 
Bros., Inc., No. BC 135198 








Radio TV Espanola S.A. v. 
New World Entm’t, Ltd., 





N Copyright statute 
of frauds 
Federal 
Rappaport v. Buske, 2000 
WL 1224828 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 29, 2000) 
O News reporter/ 
producer 
N Indef.; lack of 
intent to be 
bound. 
New York 
Lombardo v. Mauriello, 
2002 WL 31492393 (Mass. 





Zenga v. Brillstein-Grey 
Entm’t, 2003 WL 22482067 
(Cal. App. 2003) 
O Producer/ 
studio 
N Indef. California 
Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 
(3d Cir. 2004) 
O Producer/ 
consultant 
N Indef. New 
Jersey 
Portman v. Zoetrope, 
Corp., 2005 WL 1077504 
(Cal. App. 2005) 
W Producer/ 
producer 
N Indef. California 
In re My Left Hook, LLC, 





N Indef. California 
Lyrick Studios, Inc. v. Big 
Idea Prods., Inc., 420 F.3d 





N Copyright statute 
of frauds 
Federal 
Network Enters. v. APBA 
Offshore Prods., Inc., 427 
F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) 




Y179 Intent to be 
bound 
New York 
Hansen v. Geisler, 2008 
WL 5375241 (S. Ct. N.Y. 
Dec. 4, 2008) 
W Writer/ 
producer 
N No consideration New York 
The Weinstein Co. v. 
Smokewood Entm’t Grp., 




N Copyright statute 
of frauds; lack of 




Shade v. Gorman, 2009 WL 
196400 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
W Videographer/ 
studio 
N Disclaimer of 
intent to be bound 
California 
Fiat Risus, Inc. v. Frank 
and Beans Productions 
LLC, No. BC400180 (Cal. 






N Indef. California 
Trademark Props., Inc. v. 
A&E Television Networks, 




Y Def. New York 
 
 179. Agreement to negotiate in good faith. 
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Case (Year) Type 
of 
Agmt 
Parties Enf’d? Grounds Governing 
Law176 
 
Swan Media Grp., Inc. v. 




N Indef. New York 
Queen v. Schultz, 888 F. 
Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 
2012), rev’d on other 
grounds, 747 F.3d 879 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) 
O Consultant/TV 
show host 
N Indef. D.C. 
Arnett v. Howard, No. 2:13-
cv-591, 2014 WL 1165851 




Y Def. Utah 
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APPENDIX C 
TRADE-PRESS SOURCES FOR UNSIGNED-DEAL DISPUTES180 
Legend:  
DV = Daily Variety 
HR = Hollywood Reporter 
 
Date Author Title Publication 
 
1924 (Nov. 5) n/a Dana Collins in Court Over Lost Picture Role. DV 
1924 (Apr. 25) n/a Jolson, Out of Film, Sued for $571,696. N.Y. Times 
1936 (Mar. 5) n/a Terms of Cagney Deal Taxes Warner 
Memory. 
DV 
1946 (Apr. 11) n/a 20th Loses $20,000 Suit on Oral “Flat Tops” 
Deal. 
DV 
1949 (Oct.) n/a Hollywood Inside. DV 
1950 (Feb. 13) n/a Golden Arms’ Rights Subject to Suit.  DV 
1950 (Jan. 17) n/a Ramon Romero Sues Bette Davis for 142G. DV 
1952 (July 2) n/a RKO Letterheads Cited in Stars’ Suit. DV 
1952 (July 17) n/a Hughes Ponders Signing Settlement or Taking 
Stand in Simmons Trial. 
DV 
1952 (Oct. 22) n/a Werker Sues Mori Briskin; Charges Oral Pad 
Breach. 
DV 
1956 (Aug. 2) n/a Carthy Sues Donlevy. DV 
1956 (Aug. 23) n/a Hayden Suit Charges RKO Breached Oral 
Agreement; Asks 35G. 
DV 
1958 (June 26) n/a 17-Year-Old Girl Sues Over Metro ‘High 
School Confidential’.  
DV 
1959 (Sept. 8) n/a Ketti Frings’ 75G Suit Charging Breach vs. 
UA, SA, Mirisch on ‘Seesaw’.  
DV 
1960 (May 12) n/a Red Button Sues for 40G; 3d Claim Damages 
Against Ill-Fated ‘Evil’.  
DV 
1961 (Mar. 17) n/a WGA To Arbitrate ‘Small’ Plot Dispute. DV 
1963 (Mar. 12) n/a Attorney Jams Himself Trying It On Goldwyn 
in Bob Breen’s Action.  
DV 
1963 (June 5) n/a Odets Sez Deal Favoring Actor Ruined 
Writer’s Profit. 
DV 
1963 (Mar. 27) n/a Breen Fails in Suit; Sam Goldwyn Pleased DV 
1964 (Apr. 16) n/a Boyd Sues Tony Mann. DV 
1964 (Dec. 2) n/a Not Legally Binding: Tony Quinn Loses 
Action on Brynner ‘Promise’. 
DV 
1965 (Aug. 13) n/a Legal Heroics: Actors, Producer Sue Film 
Writer For $1,254,804. 
DV 
1968 (Jan. 17) n/a N.Y. Court Stalls Prem Injunction Against 
Dunaway.  
DV 
1968 (Apr. 23) n/a Lawford Sues Par, Embassy for 150G. DV 
1968 (Nov. 27) n/a Dismiss Blaustein Suit. DV 
1970 (Sept. 18) n/a Silverstein Sues Warner for 351G. DV 
1971 (Oct. 28) n/a Max von Sydow and Liz Ullman Sue Over 
‘Man’s Fate’. 
DV 
1972 (June 8) n/a Jack Palance Sues Sam Peckinpah. DV 
1972 (Oct. 30) n/a 20th Wins Dismissal of Nene Montez Suit. DV 
1975 (June 5) Tusher Troubled Tandem Hails Warning to Balky 
Stars. 
HR 
1976 (June 30) n/a Fired Much Too Soon, Dolan Sues Columbia.  DV 
1984 (Sept. 5) n/a Steenburgen Sues MGM for 10 Mil. DV 
 
 180. All Daily Variety articles were accessed through the Variety digital archive. 
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Date Author Title Publication 
 
1986 (Mar. 13) n/a De Fellita Sues Polygram Over ‘Trial’ Rights. DV 
1988 (June 8) n/a Lancaster Slaps Col With Suit For ‘Old 
Gringo’ Firing. 
DV 




1989 (May 12) n/a Kastern Sues Pacino For Contract Breach. DV 
1989 (Nov. 1) Lieberman DePalma and Litto Testify as “Dressed” Trial 
Opens. 
DV 
1991 (June 6) Rapportoni Former Uni ‘Deal-Maker’ Testifies in ‘Pirates’ 
Trial. 
DV 
1992 (Oct. 8) n/a King Can’t Cut Romola. DV 
1992 (Nov. 24) n/a De Laurentiis Sues Scripter, Agent. DV 
1992 (Dec. 5) n/a Mulcahy Sued Over ‘Highlander III’. DV 
1993 (Apr. 5) n/a In Basinger’s Wake, Bening Settles Suit. DV 
1993 (Sept. 18) Pristin Whoopi Goldberg Ends Breach-of-Contract 
Suit. 
L.A. Times 
1997 (July 14) n/a  Double trouble irks legal eagles. DV 
1997 (Oct. 31) Archerd Just for Variety. DV 
2002 (Apr. 2) Bing Kaye’s Cautionary Tale. DV 
2003 (Nov. 24) Bharataniyer Thesp’s success leads to salary strife. DV 
2004 (May 12) n/a Diane Lane settles suit with film house. UPI 
2006 (Mar. 31) n/a Basic Instinct 2 (2006): Did You Know? IMDb 
2007 (Aug. 4) Meza Goodman Sued After Refusing ‘Joan’ Job.  DV 
2007 (Nov. 23) n/a Brad Pitt Pulls Out of Universal film, risking 
lawsuit. 
AFP 
2008 (Oct. 20) Child Robin Williams unamused by pay dispute. The Guardian 
2010 (Feb. 5) n/a Robin Williams Loses $6 Million Lawsuit. Reuters 
2012 (May 11) Gardner Hollywood Docket: Brendan Fraser sues. HR 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERVIEWS 
All interviews were conducted by telephone or in-person (as 
specified below) on an anonymous basis, in Los Angeles, and on the 
dates indicated below. All interviewees are active participants in the 
film and television industries located in Southern California, either in a 
legal, business, or mixed legal and business capacity. The reference 
term is that used to refer to each interview in the text of the article. 
 
Date(s) Interviewee Reference Term 
Studio Counsel 
February 8, 2011 Former general counsel at 
major studio 
 
Studio Counsel Interview I 
Multiple dates in February–
December 2011, March 2013 
 
In-house counsel at major 
studio 
 
Studio Counsel Interview II 
August 29, 2011 In-house counsel at major 
studio 
 
Studio Counsel Interview III 
Multiple dates in February–
December, 2011; March 2013 
General counsel at “mini–
major” independent studio 
 
Mini–Major Counsel Interview 
Studio Executives 
April 16, 2013 Former chief executive of 
major studio 
 
Studio Executive Interview 
 
Entertainment Attorneys 
May 31, 2011; email 
communication, Sept. 9, 2012 
 
Senior attorney with 
entertainment practice 
Entertainment Attorney Interview 
I 
 
June 2, 2011 Law-firm partner with 
entertainment practice 
 
Entertainment Attorney Interview 
II 
 
April 9, 2013 Law-firm partner with 
entertainment practice 
Entertainment Attorney Interview 
III 
 
